本文将当代地缘政治对照 Thucydides《History of the Peloponnesian War》中「强者为所欲为、弱者受其所当受」的逻辑，指出 Donald Trump 对「rules-based international order」与 international law 的公开蔑视正在把权力政治推向极端。文中列举其言行从威胁以武力夺取 Greenland，到指示 Pentagon 可能「抹去」 Iran，并强调其自述「不需要 international law」，只以个人「morality」与「mind」作为动武的唯一约束。一名核心幕僚更将新秩序概括为由 strength、force、power 所支配，象征美国长期自我标榜的正当性外衣正在剥落。
作者以 Trump 政府的「tactically brilliant」军事行动作为转折点，特别提到在新年开端数日内逮捕 Venezuela 强人 Nicolas Maduro 及其妻 Cilia Flores，并以「Operation Absolute Resolve」展示在 Western Hemisphere 巩固势力范围的意志。此举一方面使 Canada 震动到「严肃准备」应对潜在入侵，另一方面也向其他大国提供可模仿的范例；文章并以 China 的 Venezuela-style「decapitation」drill 为证，认为 Trump 反而在塑造「Might is Right」的危险先例。由于其他强权可能在更少 international law 约束下汲取操作教训，作者判断即使 Taipei 与 Manila 目前仍倚赖西方同盟与自身能力，长期风险正在累积。
在同盟层面，文中引用 Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney 于本月 Davos 的警告，称大国将不再假装遵守 international law；并指出其批评美国紧接于访问 China、双方宣示新 strategic partnership 之后，而 Emmanuel Macron 等欧洲领导人也释出加深对华经贸意愿，让 Beijing 更易离间 Washington 与盟友。对 Philippines 而言，作者强调其在过去十年（10 years）依赖 international law 与 U.S. Navy 的间接支撑，特别是 2016 arbitral tribunal award 用以否定 China 在 South China Sea 的广泛主张；然而在 Trump 公然反法规范的背景下，Manila 更难动员外交压力，且 Beijing 可能利用 Canada 与 Europe 的疏离降低其对 Taiwan 与 Philippines 的支援意愿。文章进一步认为北京鹰派将更受鼓舞：正如其在 Gulf War 与 Taiwan Strait crisis 的 1990s 汲取美国介入的教训并推动军事现代化，如今亦从「俘获 Maduro」汲取「decapitation」操作；作者引述 Antonio Trillanes 不排除此策略被纳入对 Philippines 的长期规划，并援引 Adm. Rommel Ong 对「收编」菲方关键文武领袖的忧虑，最终可能压缩小国政策空间，并强化 Kuomintang Party 与 pro-Duterte camp 等亲 Beijing 势力的政治叙事。
The article argues that current geopolitics increasingly resembles Thucydides’ logic in the History of the Peloponnesian War that “the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must,” and it portrays Donald Trump as accelerating this shift away from a rules-based international order. It cites threats ranging from forcibly taking Greenland to Pentagon talk of potentially wiping Iran “off the face of the Earth,” and emphasizes Trump’s claim that he does not need international law, with only his own “morality” and “mind” constraining the use of force. A senior aide’s celebration of a new order “governed by strength…force…power” is presented as evidence that U.S. rhetoric about lawful, just global leadership is giving way to explicit machtpolitik.
The piece then treats recent U.S. actions as a template other powers can study, highlighting the early-year capture of Venezuelan strongman Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, and framing “Operation Absolute Resolve” as a demonstration of Washington’s determination to police its Western Hemisphere sphere. It claims this has rattled Canada into serious contingency planning for a potential American invasion while also signaling that future “kinetic” operations may proceed with fewer legal inhibitions. China’s Venezuela-style “decapitation” drill is cited as a direct lesson-drawing response, and the author warns that even if Taipei and Manila remain comparatively secure today, their long-run vulnerability grows as “Might is Right” precedents spread.
On alliances and front-line states, the article notes Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s Davos warning this month that superpowers will no longer even pretend to follow international law, and links his criticism of the U.S. to a subsequent thaw with China and talk of a new strategic partnership, alongside signals from leaders such as Emmanuel Macron favoring deeper economic ties with Beijing. For the Philippines, it stresses reliance over the past decade (10 years) on international law and indirect U.S. Navy backing of the 2016 arbitral tribunal award rejecting China’s expansive South China Sea claims, but argues Trump’s norm defiance weakens Manila’s diplomatic leverage and could reduce allied willingness in a Taiwan or Philippine contingency. It adds that Beijing hawks may be emboldened, drawing operational lessons as they did from U.S. interventions during the Gulf War and the Taiwan Strait crisis in the 1990s, and it quotes Antonio Trillanes and Adm. Rommel Ong to warn of “decapitation” planning and elite co-optation that could constrain smaller states and politically empower the Kuomintang Party in Taiwan and the pro-Duterte camp in the Philippines.