文章指出，美国以「America First」之名将货币政策工具化：Federal Reserve 在12月把政策利率下调至3.5%–3.75%（自2022年以来最低），同时停止量化紧缩，并以RMP（Reserve Management Purchases）买入短期Treasury bills，被视为伪装的量化宽松；另有计划推动Freddie Mac与Fannie Mae购买US$200 billion的mortgage-backed securities，以在mid-term election cycle前压低房贷利率。随著行政部门对央行影响上升，进一步宽松被认为更可能，包括更激进降息（Donald Trump主张利率应为1%或更低）、甚至yield curve control，以及放松银行与证券监管（尤其最低资本要求）。

其目标被描述为同时推升成长、降低政府利息支出、并以贬值美元改善贸易竞争力：作者指出利息支出已成为仅次于Social Security的第二大联邦支出项目，而更宽松的监管与RMP亦意在为持续的大额财政赤字提供融资；借由强劲名目成长、更高物价与负实质利率，进一步「通膨化」解决高公共债务问题。文中援引Herbert Hoover对「通膨与战争」带来短期繁荣、长期毁灭的警语，并认为关税、制裁与货币操作的组合将削弱他国经济主权，尤其是以美元结算与出口导向的亚洲：汇率被迫升值将打击出口、在美元计价贸易下压低本币收入，且可能输入通缩压力。

作者进一步强调外溢风险与资本流向：亚洲私人与公共储蓄常高于本地投资机会，因而持有大量美元与美国资产；若美元贬值，损失将放大，而亚洲央行与主权财富基金亦为美国公债大户。近来Japan与South Korea为降低关税，分别承诺追加对美投资US$550 billion与US$350 billion，使曝险更深；同时资本已部分转向亚洲、南美与非洲资产，含以低成本外币借款支撑的carry trades，上推本地资产价格并迫使利率政策兼顾升值与流入压力。作者警告，美国既有宽松条件与市场过热将推升股市与房市估值、加速危机，而美元与美国市场崩跌会透过资金流与制度连结传导至亚洲；因此主张亚洲需去美元化贸易、降低美元投资（短期避险、长期转向非美资产并避免透过美国资产管理人的「round-tripping」）、强化区域金融中介，且以集体协调建立区域政治经济集团；并指出此类政策可能延续至后Donald Trump时期，因其第一任措施多未被继任者Joe Biden逆转，若不迅速行动，亚洲将承担美国调整成本。

The article argues that the U.S. is weaponizing monetary policy under “America First”: in December the Federal Reserve cut its policy rate to 3.5%–3.75% (the lowest since 2022), halted quantitative tightening, and began buying short-dated Treasury bills via RMP (Reserve Management Purchases), framed as disguised quantitative easing; it also cites plans to push Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to buy US$200 billion of mortgage-backed securities to pull down mortgage rates ahead of the mid-term election cycle. With growing administrative influence over the central bank, further easing is presented as likely, including deeper cuts (Donald Trump argues rates should be 1% or lower), possible yield curve control, and weaker banking and securities regulation (especially minimum capital requirements).

The stated aims are to boost activity, reduce the government’s interest bill, and devalue the dollar to improve trade competitiveness: the interest bill is described as the second-largest federal spending item after Social Security, while looser regulation and RMP help finance continuing large deficits; strong nominal growth, higher prices, and negative real rates are positioned as a way to inflate away high public debt. Citing Herbert Hoover’s warning that inflation and war bring temporary prosperity but permanent ruin, the article contends that tariffs, sanctions, and monetary moves threaten other nations’ economic sovereignty, with Asia especially exposed because much trade is dollar-denominated and economies are export-driven: forced currency revaluation would hurt exports, reduce local-currency revenues on dollar-priced trade, and could import deflationary pressure.

It further highlights spillovers and flow dynamics: Asian private and public savings often exceed local investment options, amplifying exposure to dollars and U.S. assets, so devaluation would translate into losses, while Asian central banks and sovereign wealth funds are major holders of U.S. government bonds. Recent deals cited include Japan and South Korea agreeing to additional U.S. investments of US$550 billion and US$350 billion, respectively, to reduce tariffs, deepening exposure; meanwhile capital is already redirecting toward Asian, South American, and African assets, including carry trades funded by cheap foreign-currency borrowing, distorting local asset prices and forcing rate policy to manage appreciation and inflows. The article warns that already-loose U.S. conditions and market excesses will lift equity and property valuations and bring crisis nearer, and that a dollar and U.S.-market crash would transmit instability into Asia; it therefore urges Asia to shift trade away from the dollar, cut dollar investments (near-term hedging and controls; longer-term reallocation and avoiding “round-tripping” via U.S. asset managers), deepen regional intermediation, and coordinate as a regional bloc—arguing these policies may outlast Donald Trump because many first-term measures were not reversed by successor Joe Biden, and failure to act quickly will leave Asia bearing a large share of U.S. adjustment costs.