伊朗《Tehran Times》刊出一张声称「American radar」被毁的图像；开源情报团队发现其实是来自一年前 Bahrain 的 Google Earth 影像，遭到 AI 操作，地点与时间线对不上，车辆位置亦未改变。这张伪图在数小时内即被揭穿。随著美国、以色列与伊朗之间的海湾冲突升级，导弹与无人机开始影响卫星、导航与通讯，使先前被视为中立的关键空间资产转为可被延迟、欺骗、禁用或私有控制的对象。

在海湾，核心系统仍主要由国家支持的业者掌控：阿联酋 Space42、沙乌地主导的 Arabsat 与卡达 Es'hailSat；伊朗则透过 Paya/Tolou-3 等卫星、由俄罗斯 Vostochny Cosmodrome 送入轨道，以建立独立监测。区域卫星通信市场已超过 40 亿美元，预估 2031 年达 56.4 亿美元，增幅约 41%，其中海运平台收入接近三分之一。Planet Labs 对中东影像再延迟两周（14 天），并表示是为避免敌对方战术性利用，非应政府要求；中国的 MizarVision 因而被更多使用，伊俄与伊朗共享存取权也在重新分配可见性。

这直接影响作战验证：若缺乏近期基线影像，虚假叙事更难被推翻。1967 年《Outer Space Treaty》要求各国持续监督其空间行为者，但私人卫星企业多倚赖合约与自我规范操作。Starlink 等服务正从广泛公共可得，转向更高比例政府与安全导向安排。Flightradar24 报告战争开始以来 GPS 干扰明显增加；飞行员在双 GPS 失联时转用 DME 并暂失 Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning，且 GPS 欺骗还可能破坏机上时钟，显示海湾空域已进入常态化干扰状态。

Tehran Times published an image claiming an “American radar” had been destroyed; open-source intelligence teams found it was an AI-manipulated, one-year-old Google Earth image from Bahrain, with mismatched location and timeline and unchanged vehicle positions. The forgery was exposed within hours. As U.S.-Israel-Iran Gulf conflict intensified, missiles and drones began affecting satellites, navigation, and communications, turning critical space assets once seen as neutral into systems that can be delayed, spoofed, restricted, or privately controlled.

In the Gulf, core systems remain largely controlled by state-backed operators: UAE Space42, Saudi-led Arabsat, and Qatar's Es'hailSat, while Iran is expanding independent coverage with satellites such as Paya/Tolou-3 launched from Russia's Vostochny Cosmodrome. The regional satellite-communications market is already above US$4 billion, projected to reach US$5.64 billion by 2031, an increase of about 41%, with maritime platforms close to one-third of revenue. Planet Labs delayed Middle East imagery for two weeks (14 days), saying this was to prevent tactical exploitation rather than comply with any government request; China-based MizarVision use has since risen, and Iranian access-sharing with Russia and China is redistributing who can see.

This directly affects operational verification: without recent baseline imagery, false narratives are harder to rebut. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty gives states responsibility for space actors under their authority, yet private satellite firms mostly rely on contracts and self-regulation. Starlink-like services are shifting from broad public access toward more state-driven security arrangements. Flightradar24 reports a marked increase in GPS interference since the war started; when both GPS links drop, pilots switch to DME and temporarily lose Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning, while GPS spoofing can also corrupt onboard clocks, making Gulf airspace navigation increasingly routine-risk in practice.