川普预计将于5月中旬访问北京，这将是他近10年来的首次访华，但伊朗战争可能使行程延后；届时他的处境也会比他在6个月前于南韩会见习近平时更为不利。文章将此描述为川普自重新掌权以来第二次高估美国对主要对手的杠杆，并引发更广泛经济后果。川普先是试图以关税向中国施压，如今又在面对伊朗；美国与以色列的打击已造成伊朗大部分政治领导层死亡，而德黑兰几乎封闭了荷姆兹海峡，这是石油和大宗商品的重要通道。
文章的主要论点是，与美国相比，中国更能应对这类冲击。习近平在2023年5月、在Covid-19以及川普第一任期的制裁和关税之后，要求采取「极端情境」思维；3年后，中国被描述为准备最充分的大型经济体之一。其韧性来自对清洁能源和煤炭的重金投入：它拥有全球最大的已装设太阳能容量，约一半新售汽车为电动车，煤炭仍供应约一半电力，而能源自给率已达约80%；去年其最大的石油供应国是俄罗斯，占17.5%，以及沙乌地阿拉伯，占15%。相较之下，川普面临压力，必须在6月中旬前将汽油价格降至每加仑约3美元，较目前水平低约25%，而华盛顿也因对俄罗斯和伊朗出口的临时放宽而看到其制裁杠杆减弱。
文章还指出，在当前危机之前，中国已准备好一项强大的反制工具，自2020年起建立出口管制，并在川普重返白宫前夕加以扩大。北京的稀土许可制度帮助在去年促成休战，因为2024年价值约29亿美元、且不到中国3.6兆美元总出口1%的磁铁出口，曾扰乱全球供应链。文章如今形容伊朗透过荷姆兹对峙控制了全球约五分之一的石油和天然气出口，但其杠杆可能不会那么持久；同时，中国可因对再生能源需求上升而受益，并可能扩大太阳能板、电池和电动车出口。文章最后说，川普在中国和伊朗问题上的失利正在削弱美国信誉，而习近平仍对直接军事行动保持谨慎，尤其是在台湾问题上；中国可对这个生产全球约60%半导体的岛屿施加政治压力，或采取隔离措施。
Donald Trump is expected to visit Beijing in mid-May for his first trip in almost 10 years, though the Iran war could delay it, and he will arrive on weaker footing than when he met Xi Jinping in South Korea 6 months earlier. The article frames this as the second time since returning to power that Trump has overestimated US leverage against a major adversary and triggered wider economic consequences. After trying to pressure China with tariffs, he is now confronting Iran after US-Israeli strikes killed much of Iran’s political leadership, while Tehran has nearly closed the Strait of Hormuz, a critical route for oil and commodities.
The main argument is that China is better prepared than the US for this kind of shock. Xi ordered an “extreme-case scenario” mindset in May 2023 after Covid-19 and Trump’s first-term sanctions and tariffs, and 3 years later China is portrayed as one of the best-prepared major economies. Its resilience comes from heavy investment in clean energy and coal: it has the world’s largest installed solar capacity, about half of new cars sold are electric, coal still generates about half of power, and energy self-sufficiency has reached about 80%; last year its largest oil suppliers were Russia at 17.5% and Saudi Arabia at 15%. By contrast, Trump faces pressure to cut gasoline prices to about $3 a gallon by mid-June, roughly 25% below current levels, while Washington also sees its sanctions leverage weakened by temporary easing on Russian and Iranian exports.
The article also says China had prepared a powerful countertool before the current crisis, building export controls since 2020 and widening them just before Trump returned to office. Beijing’s rare-earth licensing regime helped force a truce last year after exports of magnets, worth about $2.9 billion in 2024 and less than 1% of China’s $3.6 trillion in total exports, disrupted global supply chains. Iran is now described as controlling roughly a fifth of global oil and gas exports through the Hormuz standoff, but its leverage may be less durable; meanwhile, China stands to gain from higher demand for renewables and could expand exports of solar panels, batteries, and electric vehicles. The piece concludes that Trump’s failures against China and Iran are eroding US credibility, while Xi remains cautious about direct military action, especially over Taiwan, where China could use political pressure or a quarantine against an island that produces about 60% of the world’s semiconductors.