2月24日，德国总理弗里德里希·默茨将在近十个月后才访问德国最大贸易伙伴中国，并携30位商界领袖前往北京，这表明他将不同于默克尔和朔尔茨时期更快且更偏商业化的对华接触。此次访问也处在更阴沉的安全背景下，因柏林认为中国在支持俄罗斯对乌克兰的战争，并且网络攻击与间谍活动报告正在上升。
核心经济趋势是失衡急剧扩大：包括汽车在内的德国对华出口大幅下滑，而中国进口激增，推动德国对华贸易逆差达到900亿欧元（1050亿美元），约占GDP的2%。行业压力正从最易受冲击的领域扩散到汽车、化工和制药，加剧了“2.0版中国冲击”的担忧，即巴登-符腾堡等地区可能在3月8日选举前面临去工业化风险。
企业应对正在分化：一些跨国公司继续加码在华投资，更多企业将供应链和研发本地化到中国，而大众等公司把中国作为出口枢纽的同时在德国裁员。政策层面也同样分裂，但欧洲层面的方向更趋强硬，包括更严格的投资审查、可能将中国供应商排除在德国6G网络之外，以及有选择性的“购买欧洲”规则，尽管官员警告报复和供应链勒索风险。
On February 24, Chancellor Friedrich Merz travels to Beijing with 30 business leaders after a nearly ten-month delay in visiting Germany’s largest trading partner, signaling a break from Merkel and Scholz’s faster, business-heavy China engagement. The trip reflects a darker security backdrop, as Berlin links China to support for Russia’s war in Ukraine and reports rising cyber-attacks and espionage.
The core economic trend is a sharp imbalance: German exports to China, including cars, have plunged while Chinese imports have surged, pushing Germany’s trade deficit with China to €90bn ($105bn), about 2% of GDP. Sectoral pressure is broadening from highly exposed industries to cars, chemicals, and pharma, reinforcing “China shock 2.0” fears that regions like Baden-Württemberg could face deindustrialization ahead of its March 8 election.
Corporate responses are splitting: some multinationals are expanding in China, more firms are localizing supply chains and R&D there, and companies like Volkswagen are using China as an export hub while cutting jobs in Germany. Policy is similarly divided, but the direction is firmer at the European level through tougher investment screening, possible exclusion of Chinese vendors from Germany’s 6G network, and selective “buy Europe” rules, even as officials warn of retaliation and supply-chain blackmail.
Source: How Germany fell out of love with China
Subtitle: Chinese industry is beating Germany at its own game. Cue panic
Dateline: 2月 19, 2026 04:18 上午 | Berli