Donald Trump 正在筹备为期两天的北京行程，这一背景是三年前因台海疑虑与外交摩擦而紧张的美中关系，以及随后于2024年10月在南韩与习近平达成的休战。文章回顾拜登在2023年APEC时期于San Francisco举行的Filoli会晤，显示高层个人外交可以呈现友好象征，但实质往往有限：即使有展示一张38年前在Golden Gate拍摄的旧照，也仅传递「关系稳定」讯号。当时北京曾收紧关键矿物供应、并使美国关税压力一度冲到145%，因此之后的降税被视为华府已不再完全处于主导地位的重要信号。
历史表明，领导人会晤可以在一段时间内重置政策，但很少改写结构性竞争。自1972年（Nixon–Mao）到后来Carter与Reagan–Deng时期，接触与合作一再在Tiananmen事件（1989）及1999年Belgrade使馆爆炸等挫折后中断。2014年Obama与Xi在APEC期间讨论东海与南海军事化，再加上Xi的「Made in China 2025」将晶片、机械设备列为核心，显示贸易与科技领域的长期竞争。即便反复尝试高层默契，新冠疫情时期的责任指责政治仍再次使合作降温。
即将召开的会谈中，亚洲盟友最关切的是安全问题，特别是台湾。习近平认为Trump偏向交易并期望可见成果，如Boeing订单、大豆交易及可能的贸易理事会；中国可能同时要求在台湾和香港措辞上更软，并可利用其作为伊朗最大原油买家的地位施加杠杆。分析人士指出，结构性目标未变：习侧重在第15个五年计划下争取技术自主与加速与西方先进制造供应链的脱钩，凡是华府在台湾议题上出现实质让步，皆可能被视为重大战略误判。
Donald Trump is preparing for a two-day trip to Beijing after three years of tense U.S.-China relations and after the 2024 truce with Xi in South Korea. The article revisits the 2023 Biden Xi meeting during APEC in San Francisco to show that leader-level diplomacy can be symbolic but often limited: even a 38-year-old Golden Gate photo mainly signaled “stability.” Beijing had tightened exports of critical minerals, pushing U.S. tariff pressure up to 145%, so the later rollback signaled that Washington no longer holds unquestioned command.
History shows leader-level meetings can reset policy temporarily but rarely override structural rivalry. From the 1972 Nixon-Mao era through the Carter and Reagan-Deng period, engagement was repeatedly disrupted by shocks such as Tiananmen in 1989 and the 1999 Belgrade embassy bombing. The 2014 Obama Xi APEC discussion on East and South China Sea militarisation, and Xi’s Made in China 2025 focus on chips and machine tools, already signaled long-term rivalry in trade and technology. Even with repeated attempts at personal rapport, blame politics during the Covid period cooled ties again.
The upcoming talks most worry Asia allies about security, especially Taiwan. Xi is seen as viewing Trump as transactional and focused on concrete outcomes, such as Boeings, soyabeans, and perhaps a trade board, while China may seek softer language on Taiwan and Hong Kong and use its role as Iran’s biggest oil buyer as leverage. Analysts say structural goals remain unchanged: Xi is pursuing technological autonomy and faster decoupling from Western advanced manufacturing under the 15th five-year plan, and any substantive U.S. concession on Taiwan is widely viewed as a major strategic miscalculation.