台湾是一个富裕且以出口为导向的经济体，人均产出经生活成本调整后高于澳大利亚、德国和日本，但面临严重失衡。芯片和服务器出口在五年内约增长300%，带来创纪录的贸易顺差——十月货物月度顺差达226亿美元（年化占GDP 31%），今年迄今经常账户顺差约为GDP的16%（2010年代约为10%）。大麦克指数显示新台币严重被低估：约55%，在所追踪的53种货币中最弱。

为维持出口竞争力，中央银行实质压低汇率，外汇储备从1998年的900亿美元（占GDP 32%）扩张至现在的6000亿美元（占GDP 72%）。国民储蓄率约为GDP的39%（富裕国家平均22%，中国42%），私人消费自1998年以来下降了20个百分点至占GDP的45%。单位劳动成本自1998年下降约25%。低利率（自2000年代中期以来平均房贷利率约2%，1998年为8%）与高储蓄推动房价较1998年上涨逾4倍；台北中位房价收入比为16。

这些政策带来金融风险：寿险业对储户承诺9600亿美元，支持资产7000亿美元，存在约2000亿美元未对冲风险（约占GDP的25%）。台积电每1%汇率升值会压缩0.4个百分点利润率；高盛估计汇率升值10%会让一半上市制造商的出口变得无利可图。中央银行在2023年向政府移转收益占政府收入的6%（平均为0.4%）。政治与出口部门压力维持现状，但持续的顺差和资产错配使得一次混乱的调整愈发可能。

Taiwan is a wealthy, export-driven economy with output per person higher than Australia, Germany or Japan, but faces severe imbalances. Chip and server exports have risen about 300% over five years, producing record trade surpluses—October’s monthly goods surplus hit $22.6bn (an annualised 31% of GDP)—and a current-account surplus of roughly 16% of GDP so far this year (vs ~10% in the 2010s). The Taiwan dollar is massively undervalued: the Big Mac index implies about 55% undervaluation, the weakest of 53 currencies tracked.

To keep exports competitive the central bank has effectively suppressed the currency, expanding foreign reserves from $90bn (32% of GDP) in 1998 to $600bn (72% of GDP) now. Gross national savings run at ~39% of GDP (rich-world average 22%, China 42%), while private consumption has fallen 20 percentage points since 1998 to 45% of GDP. Unit labour costs have dropped ~25% since 1998. Low interest rates (average mortgage lending ~2% since mid-2000s vs 8% in 1998) and high savings have pushed house prices >4x since 1998; Taipei’s median price-to-income is 16.

The policy creates financial strains: life insurers promise $960bn backed by $700bn foreign assets, leaving about $200bn unhedged risk (~25% of GDP). A 1% appreciation cuts TSMC margins by 0.4 percentage points; Goldman Sachs estimates 10% appreciation would make half of listed manufacturers’ exports unprofitable. The central bank’s transfers supplied 6% of government revenue in 2023 (vs 0.4% average). Political and export-sector pressure keeps the peg, but the persistent surpluses and asset mismatches make a messy correction increasingly likely.