中委关系在 2023 年升级为「全天候战略伙伴关系」，而石油约占委内瑞拉海外收入的 95%。两国经贸与军事往来紧密：2024 年年度贸易流量超过 71 亿美元；委内瑞拉在截至 2020 年的十年间购买约 4.95 亿美元中国武器。
财务上，中国自 2007 年起成为关键贷方；公开数据显示截至 2015 年透过石油抵押贷款累计放贷逾 600 亿美元，估计已偿还约 80%，剩余债务约 120 亿美元。官方数据称自 2025 年 3 月起无对华出货，但船运追踪显示 2025 年下半年流量仍强，且这些桶量仅占中国 2025 年石油进口的 4%；同时有「数千万桶」在亚洲海域油轮上作缓冲。若美国加深介入，还可能影响中石化与中石油合计约 44 亿桶的权益主张，并与 2025 年 12 月美国新版国安战略、以及对台军售最高 110 亿美元等更广泛竞争相互交织。
The early-January 2026 US ouster of Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro undercuts China’s Latin America strategy. China is Venezuela’s biggest crude buyer and creditor and had backed Maduro amid sanctions, but now may need to recalibrate while still avoiding direct confrontation with Washington.
Beijing elevated ties to an “all-weather strategic partnership” in 2023, as oil accounts for about 95% of Venezuela’s overseas revenue. Economic and military links are material: 2024 trade flows topped $7.1 billion, and Venezuela bought about $495 million of Chinese arms in the decade ending 2020.
Financially, China became a key lender in 2007; public data indicates over $60 billion in oil-backed loans through 2015, with roughly 80% repaid and around $12 billion outstanding. Officially, China has received no Venezuelan shipments since March 2025, yet tracking suggests robust second-half 2025 flows; those barrels were only 4% of China’s 2025 imports, with “tens of millions” more afloat as a buffer. Deeper US involvement could also cloud Sinopec/CNPC claims of about 4.4 billion barrels, amid a December 2025 US security strategy shift and arms sales to Taiwan up to $11 billion.
