文章以2026年1月7日的观察指出：即使美国在地缘政治与政策上出现前所未见的动荡迹象，经济仍在成长、股市仍创新高，因而引发「为何没有崩盘」的疑问；作者强调，一年前人们对这种转向的主观机率几乎可视为接近0，但市场表现并不能直接等同于政策正确。

核心区分在于：金融市场的「崩盘」（突然下跌并外溢到实体经济）与「不良政策带来的长期、缓慢损失」没有必然连结。市场会被看似合理的叙事推动，也可能在几乎没有新资讯时剧烈转向；例如美股在1929年9月未能可靠评估前景，约3年后跌幅曾达89%，说明「当下最好的读数」在历史上也常常不可靠。

作者认为当前乐观叙事包括AI提升生产力、减税与松绑推升获利、以及部分政策冲击终将被证明较小；但即便没有崩盘，关税、扩大举债与央行可信度受损仍会累积成本。以英国脱欧为例：没有股灾、没有衰退，但研究估计到「去年」为止，投资比反事实情境低12%–18%，产出低6%–8%，且未来可能恶化；因此最可能的「最佳情境」是无崩盘但表现更差，而全面危机仍未排除。

Dated Jan. 7, 2026, the piece asks why U.S. markets and growth remain resilient despite escalating geopolitical and policy disruption. The author argues that a year earlier the odds of such a lurch toward disorder would have been judged near zero, so record highs in equities cannot be read as proof that the underlying policies are sound.

It stresses a basic distinction: a market “crash” (an abrupt financial reversal with cascading economic effects) is not tightly linked to the slow, cumulative losses from bad policy. Markets process information but can be swept by narratives and shift suddenly on little new data; the U.S. stock market misread conditions in September 1929, and roughly three years later it was down 89%, illustrating how today’s “best reading” can be reliably unreliable.

Optimistic narratives—AI-driven productivity, tax cuts and deregulation, and the idea that disruptive moves will prove less costly—may hold up markets until they don’t, while tariffs, rising borrowing, and weakened Fed credibility still add steady drag via inefficiency and higher long-term rates. As an analogy, post-Brexit Britain avoided a crash and recession yet showed chronic underperformance: by “last year,” estimated investment was 12%–18% lower and output 6%–8% lower than a comparator-based counterfactual, with losses likely to worsen. The implied best case is no crash but worse performance than otherwise, and a larger break remains possible.