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中日因台湾议题的言论升温后,中国宣布立即禁止对日本出口所有可能具有军事用途的物项,最直接冲击的是含钕、镨并加入钐、镝、铽的高强度稀土永磁体。中国约生产全球 80% 的钕磁体;在其余约 20% 中,日本单独制造约一半,水准远高于其约 5% 的全球制造占比。

日本因 2010 年的类似威胁而提前多年分散供应链并建立库存,因此过去的压力相对可控。去年在与美国关税争端引发的限制中,美方为磁体供应被迫谈判,而日本信越在 7 月仍称其磁体工厂满负荷运转;相较之下,欧洲制造商的出口许可申请仅约四分之一在 6 月被处理,导致产线与工厂停摆。印度也出现相同情况,TVS Motor 的负责人在 7 月表示其靠动用本地库存「以日为单位」维持生产(如电动 iQube 机车)。

若此次承诺的更严厉管制落地,日本仍可能受伤:即便已分散十多年,日本约 70% 的稀土供应仍依赖中国,且替代来源主要集中在较常见的钕与镨,钐、镝、铽的拓展偏慢。与此同时,过去 12 个月各国政府支持推动全球多地新设施加速落地;稀土产业虽复杂但仍远比建立 3 纳米晶片供应链容易。Neo 在爱沙尼亚的磁体厂仅用 500 天建成并于 9 月开幕、商业销售预计今年稍后开始;Solvay 在法国线去年 4 月启动后已生产钐,并预计今年开始输出镝与铽,显示中国越公开施压,越会催生竞争者、削弱其长期优势。

After tensions with Japan over Taiwan-related remarks, China said it would immediately ban exports to Japan of all items with potential military applications, with rare-earth permanent magnets the clearest target. These magnets rely on neodymium and praseodymium, increasingly blended with samarium, dysprosium, and terbium. China makes about 80% of the world’s neodymium magnets; of the remaining ~20%, Japan alone manufactures about half—far above its roughly 5% share of global manufacturing.

Japan is unusually insulated because it spent years diversifying and stockpiling after a similar shock in 2010. In last year’s “Liberation Day” tariff dispute, the US ended up negotiating for magnet supplies, while Shin-Etsu said in July its magnet factory kept running at full capacity. Elsewhere, Europe was hit: only about a quarter of exporters’ license requests were being processed in June, forcing shutdowns. India faced similar strain, with TVS Motor saying in July it was “managing on a daily basis” by drawing down local stocks for vehicles like the electric iQube scooter.

A deeper crackdown could still bite because Japan reportedly depends on China for about 70% of its rare-earth supply, and diversification has been faster for neodymium/praseodymium than for samarium, dysprosium, and terbium. But global capacity is rising, helped by government support over the past 12 months, and rare-earth plants—while complex—are far easier to replicate than 3‑nanometer chip supply chains. Neo built an Estonia magnet plant in 500 days, opened in September, with commercial sales due later this year; Solvay’s France line began last April, is already producing samarium, and is set to add dysprosium and terbium this year. By flaunting control, Beijing accelerates competitors and weakens its long-run leverage.

2026-01-08 (Thursday) · c14684d2ec99ee40f922e633b0e225d485139598