文章主张，美中于 2026 年首次峰会虽可能聚焦晶片、黄豆、台湾、伊朗与 AI 等议题，但核武才是最具存亡性的议程；作者认为若 Donald Trump 与 Xi Jinping 今年稍晚再会，核武必须被纳入。关键时间点是 2 月 6 日（New START 期满后一天），美国军控官员 Thomas DiNanno 在日内瓦裁军会议警告中国核力量快速扩张与用核准则不透明且变动迅速。

数据上，中国被估计已拥有约 600 枚核弹头，预测至 2030 年达 1,000 枚，并可能持续增建以趋近与美俄「对等」。美国约有 3,700 枚核弹头，其中约 1,770 枚属「部署」状态；俄罗斯总量更多，但部署数大致相近。DiNanno 并指称中国进行过核爆试验，且准备过「当量在数百公吨（hundreds of tons）」级别的试验，并以「decoupling」等方式用厚钢壁降低地震波以规避监测；美方未公开决定性证据，中方否认，但此指控构成 Trump 曾提及可能与中俄「在同等基础」恢复核试的背景，将使长期暂停核试的惯例与《全面禁止核试验条约》（三国已签署但未批准）的实质效力面临瓦解。

分析亦指出，中国在联合国《不扩散核武条约》检讨会议等场域对外宣示支持暂停核试与裁军以影响「全球南方」，但同时拒绝参与美俄中三边军控谈判，且在 Xi 时期逐步偏离 1964 年以来的「最低吓阻」传统与名义上的「不首先使用」。近年弹头规模与型态更趋多样，包含较多低当量／「战术」核弹头，并被描述为更接近冷战时期美国的「弹性选项」与「预警即发射（launch on warning）」逻辑，以追求对美国的吓阻与升级优势；在中国与俄罗斯、北韩关系下，华府被迫评估多核对手联动情境，全球核不稳定与军备竞赛风险上升，而峰会成败可由两国是否为后续会晤铺路以讨论核风险来衡量。

The context argues that a 2026 first US–China summit may dwell on chips, soybeans, Taiwan, Iran, AI, and deal-making, yet nuclear weapons are the most existential issue and should be on the agenda if Donald Trump and Xi Jinping meet again later this year. A key date is February 6, the day after New START expired, when US arms-control official Thomas DiNanno warned in Geneva about rapid growth in China’s nuclear forces and opaque, fast-changing nuclear-use doctrines.

Numerically, China is estimated to have about 600 warheads and is projected to reach 1,000 by 2030, potentially continuing until it nears parity with the US and Russia. The United States has about 3,700 total warheads, including roughly 1,770 deployed; Russia has more overall but a similar deployed number. DiNanno also alleged that China conducted nuclear explosive tests and prepared tests with yields in the hundreds of tons, using “decoupling” with thick steel walls to damp seismic signals; the US has offered no publicly decisive proof and China denies the charge, but it forms the backdrop to Trump’s suggestion that the US might resume testing “on an equal basis” with China and Russia, risking the long moratorium and the de facto force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which all three signed but have not ratified.

The analysis further says China publicly supports a testing moratorium and disarmament at venues such as the UN Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference to impress the Global South, while refusing trilateral arms-control talks and, under Xi, drifting from the post-1964 “minimum deterrent” tradition and the formal “no first use” policy. Recent growth in arsenal size and variety includes more low-yield “tactical” options and an approach likened to Cold War US thinking—flexible nuclear options and “launch on warning”—aimed at deterrence and escalation dominance. With China aligned with Russia and North Korea, US planners must consider multi-adversary scenarios, nuclear instability and arms-race risks are rising, and the summit’s value can be judged by whether it leaves room for the leaders to address nuclear danger in a later meeting.