文章主张在对中政策中，台湾是不可作为交易筹码的「珍贵筹码」之一；把台湾拿来换取贸易让步将削弱美国在亚洲的安全架构，尤其是第一岛链的吓阻功能，并向东京到马尼拉的盟友释放「一切皆可谈判」的危险讯号。台湾同时是先进半导体供应核心，约生产全球最先进晶片的 90%，支撑人工智慧等产业与军事竞争；台海危机也会冲击全球最繁忙航道之一的贸易流。
Donald Trump 与 Xi Jinping 将于周四在北京会面，为两人自 10 月在南韩会晤后的首次面对面会谈；议程以关税、美国农产品出口、科技限制与 Boeing 飞机等贸易议题为主，但伊朗与台湾等地缘政治势必介入。外界担心 Trump 可能以「台北换德黑兰」，而北京将台湾视为最重要红线并多次要求美方停止对台军售；Trump 亦曾以交易式语言谈论台美关系，并于 2 月拒答是否阻止中国以武力夺岛。
新加坡 S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies 的 Drew Thompson 认为，Trump 不会为「几颗豆子」出卖台湾，若真交换也会追求更大让步（例如国企补贴、产业政策、技术转移与更平衡贸易），但这些正触及中国经济模式与国安核心、因此不太可能让步；在 2026 年的 Xi 权力更集中、较 2017 年更自信，并可能藉峰会逼迫美方调整对台地位用语。北京同时以近乎每日的军机军舰活动与外交施压（如上周赞比亚在压力下取消一场与台湾参与相关的数位人权活动）缩限台湾国际空间；但民意长期偏好维持现状且认同更趋「台湾人」，Lowy Institute 研究并警告若遭并吞，将以长期社会改造排除「数百万」台湾人、并可能囚禁现任政治领袖，美国因而应持续军售、与日本及菲律宾协调并预作应变，而对台湾最好的峰会结果或许是 Trump 什么都别说。
The article argues that Taiwan is a non-negotiable strategic asset in U.S. dealings with China, and using it as trade bait would undermine America’s Asian security architecture, especially the First Island Chain, while alarming allies from Tokyo to Manila that core U.S. commitments can be bargained away. Taiwan is also central to the global technology base, producing about 90% of the world’s most advanced semiconductors that underpin AI and other high-growth, dual-use industries. A Taiwan Strait crisis would therefore extend beyond security to disrupt one of the world’s busiest trade arteries.
Donald Trump and Xi Jinping are set to meet Thursday in Beijing for their first face-to-face talks since meeting in South Korea in October, with modest expectations and a trade-heavy agenda focused on tariffs, U.S. farm exports, technology restrictions, and Boeing aircraft. Geopolitical issues—especially Iran and Taiwan—are expected to intrude, raising fears that Trump could trade Taipei for concessions related to Tehran. Beijing treats Taiwan as its most important red line and repeatedly demands an end to U.S. arms sales, while Trump has at times framed ties transactionally and in February declined to state whether U.S. policy is to stop China from taking the island by force. (Key numbers: 10, 2)
Analyst Drew Thompson says Trump is unlikely to trade Taiwan for small agricultural deals, but if he traded it at all it would be for major Chinese concessions on state subsidies, industrial policy, technology transfers, and a more balanced trade relationship—precisely the areas China is least willing to change because they sit at the core of its economic model and national security strategy. With Xi in 2026 more powerful and self-assured than during Trump’s 2017 visit, Beijing may seek even a rhetorical shift on Taiwan’s status, while applying near-daily military pressure and diplomatic isolation tactics (such as Zambia canceling a digital human-rights event last week after Chinese pressure). Yet Taiwanese opinion continues to favor the status quo and a Taiwanese identity; Lowy Institute research warns annexation planning could exclude millions from public life and jail current leaders, so Washington is urged to keep arms sales moving, coordinate with Japan and the Philippines, and prepare contingencies—making the best outcome for Taiwan a summit in which Trump says nothing at all.