此次采访的核心是：以色列看待对伊朗战争，不是主要看特朗普何时「停止」，而是把它视为一场延伸中的安全战役；连续四周以色列空军每日空袭伊朗，伊朗的报复攻击仍在持续，而以色列自2023年10月7日以来已处于近乎持续的战备状态，约900天。Shira Efron指出，民意支持仍偏高但并不均衡，调查显示约80%偏向支持，但日常生活已被消耗：居家防空掩体、6到10分钟内响起警报、部分人预备役服役接近800天，以及加萨阶段累积经济损失已高于570亿美元。她补充，2025年宣称已解除伊朗核威胁、真主党已被重创的反复预言，与再次开战形成落差，扩大了公众对本轮战事能否达成目标的疑问。

在政治面向，Benjamin Netanyahu对伊朗四十年的执著与末日式修辞在其安全观中确实真实，但Efron认为这场战争同时也符合避免大选的国内政治逻辑。以色列在重大冲突期间通常不利于在野竞选，使得即将到来的投票更关键。美国角色是决定性的：在先前12天作战中，Donald Trump先批准以色列空袭，再下令驻守机组返航离开德黑兰，她认为现今作战指挥的核心已聚焦于一位指挥者——特朗普。她也警告，当美国民意向巴勒斯坦倾斜且欧洲监督加强时，若再加上对美国犹太离散社群关系与欧洲关系受损，将使以色列承受压力，尤其在反犹太事件上升之际，即使政策批评与仇恨仍有本质区别，政治代价也难以避免。

在黎巴嫩前线，她担忧次要战线若缺乏更广泛的伊朗—真主党政治安排，可能变成主要战场；持续打击与以军进驻若被固化，将形成事实上的缓冲区，甚至走向长期占领。她认为对真主党与哈马斯的武力去武装化已失败：停火后仅5个月，哈马斯仍在加萨半区实际统治，尽管过去两年持续以武力进行「去武装」，仍难以改变现况，因此必须配合政治路径。加萨死亡人数报导达70,000，并伴随西岸事实上吞并与定居者暴力上升、舆论右移，若未出现能兼顾安全与外交、执行停火的新领导，Efron担忧硬化路径将延续到2028；反之，若选举后政府真正把停火、邻国关系与和平路线放在优先顺序，仍有修正机会。

The interview says Israel sees the Iran war less through Trump’s timeline and more as a prolonged security campaign: for four weeks jets have struck Iran daily while retaliatory attacks continue, after Israel has already been in near-continuous war footing for about 900 days since Oct. 7, 2023. Efron says support is still high but uneven—surveys around 80% favor it—while daily life is worn down by shelters, sirens reached in 6–10 minutes, reserve duty near 800 days for some, and cumulative economic costs already above US$57 billion tied to the Gaza phase. She adds that repeated claims of Iran’s resolved nuclear threat in 2025 and Hezbollah’s supposed decimation, then another strike cycle, have widened the gap between official promises and reality and raised doubts that another military round can reach its goal.

Politically, Netanyahu’s four-decade fixation on Iran and apocalyptic rhetoric is real in his worldview, yet Efron argues the war also fits a domestic logic of election delay. In Israel, incumbents often avoid campaigning during major conflict, making timing important ahead of key votes. The U.S. role is decisive: during the earlier 12-day campaign Trump first approved Israel’s air campaign and later ordered planes turning back from Tehran, and Efron says the operational hierarchy now points to one commander—Trump. She warns Israel also risks global drift as U.S. public opinion shifts toward Palestinian sympathy and European scrutiny, while ties with the Jewish Diaspora and Europe remain strategic assets that can be damaged. Rising antisemitic incidents add pressure even though policy criticism and hatred remain distinct.

On Lebanon, she fears a secondary front could become primary: if no broader Iran–Hezbollah settlement follows, strike campaigns and IDF positions could harden into a de facto buffer zone and long-term occupation. She says disarmament by force has failed with Hezbollah and Hamas—five months after the ceasefire, Hamas remains a de facto authority over half of Gaza despite two years of kinetic attempts, so a political track is essential. With a Gaza death toll reported at 70,000 and visible de facto annexation and settler violence in the West Bank, public opinion has moved right; she worries a hard-line trajectory could persist into 2028 unless elections produce leadership able to pair security with diplomacy and ceasefire enforcement.