在1990年代后期，1995年至2000年的连续6年，美国非住宅固定资本形成（含结构、设备与智慧财产）每年对GDP成长贡献逾1个百分点，这在1930年后统计中罕见。Greenspan当时提出两股力量：第一是资讯科技与电信投资，第二是全球化。这股全球化力量在十年后才被更清楚证实，当中国及前苏联经济体逐步纳入供应链时，全球单位劳动成本上升速度受到抑制，而他明确称中国是最主要的贡献者。中国美国进口渗透率上升亦使多数进口品价格在1990年代后半趋缓。当前局势却不同：2026年3月初美国关税约11%，且若为再工业化/回流生产，因美国劳动成本较高，未必能重现1990年代那种由全球供应链压低成本的通缩效果。
财政与劳动力环境同样已变。1990年代初美国财政赤字高于GDP的4%，但至年底因支出抑制与税收上升转为盈余，帮助压低长端借贷利率；而最近三年，扣除2025年的学生贷款会计处理后，联邦赤字接近GDP的6%，同时国库仅支付利息每年就需另发行约1兆美元公债，与私部门AI资本需求争夺资金，也可能将中性利率抬高。劳动市场亦受打击：在移民限制与大规模遣返政策下，劳动人力大幅萎缩。Greenspan晚期提醒过，90年代科技外包扩张同时伴随就业不安全与弱势薪资协商；若这一机制在AI时代同样出现，对通胀未必形成正向帮助。Powell则称AI若提升潜在产出是值得重视的，但目前并未显示立即降息讯号，技术革命仍需置于完整宏观背景下判断。
Two decades after Alan Greenspan left the Fed, the article says Trump’s economic team (Scott Bessent, Kevin Hassett, and nominee Kevin Warsh) framed the AI surge as a repeat of the 1990s internet period: massive private spending, disinflation, and scope for lower rates. They argue Jerome Powell kept borrowing costs too high and blocked investment, while AI infrastructure is already costing U.S. hyperscalers hundreds of billions of dollars yearly and is expected to be worth about $3 trillion in coming years. The article counters that Greenspan’s 2006 takeaway was broader: the earlier U.S. disinflation was not driven by technology alone but also by an external price anchor, especially cheaper Chinese imports.
In the late 1990s, nonresidential fixed investment in the U.S. rose for six straight years starting in 1995, adding more than 1 percentage point to annual GDP growth—an unusual pattern in post-1930 data. Greenspan saw two forces at work: computing and telecom investment, plus globalization. A decade later, integration of China and ex-Soviet economies into supply chains dampened global unit labor-cost growth, and Greenspan named China as the dominant contributor. As China’s share of U.S. imports rose, many import prices decelerated. The current setup is materially different: U.S. tariff rates are around 11% in early March 2026, and reshoring production to higher-cost domestic labor is unlikely to recreate the imported-deflation dynamic that supported 1990s disinflation.
Fiscal and labor conditions have also diverged. In the 1990s, the U.S. fiscal deficit moved from above 4% of GDP to surplus by decade’s end, helping keep long-term borrowing costs lower. In the last three years, after a 2025 accounting adjustment, the deficit has been around 6% of GDP; the Treasury must issue roughly an additional $1 trillion in debt just to service interest, competing with private AI investors and potentially lifting the neutral rate. Meanwhile immigration limits and large deportations have sharply reduced labor supply, while AI deployment can either raise productivity or reduce labor demand. Greenspan had already warned that 1990s productivity gains were partly tied to job insecurity and muted wage gains in outsourced sectors. Powell now says productivity gains from technological advances are welcome, but the current inflation outlook still does not provide an immediate case for easier monetary policy.