文章将 Trump 的对外方式描绘为过时的“炮舰外交”，其核心模式是高估威慑、低估对手意志。2 月 19 日，在开战前几天，Steve Witkoff 公开表示 White House 对伊朗未在美国海上武力集结面前“投降”感到“好奇”。随后伊朗对大多数航运关闭 Hormuz，Washington 又被指对这一反制准备不足，尽管 Pentagon 否认“措手不及”。这一时间序列表明，Trump 政府反复预期快速屈服，却持续遭遇相反结果。
类似误判也出现在 Venezuela。美国在 1 月抓获 Nicolás Maduro 并扶植 Delcy Rodríguez 上位，但文章称，在此之前 White House 原以为空袭所谓运毒船只就能迫使 Maduro 让步。这反映出一种重复的战略假设：只要增加轰炸威胁或短期军事压力，对方就会按美国设定行动。作者认为，这种假设忽视了意识形态、民族主义与政权生存逻辑，而 Trump 及其盟友又把 19 世纪帝国扩张视为正面范本，从 Greenland 到西半球皆如此。
文章进一步指出，这种历史观与现实均不符。欧洲帝国衰落并非因为“觉醒”，而是因战后破产、殖民统治成本上升及民族主义反弹；美国过去虽有虚伪之处，但在冷战中至少力图把自己塑造成支持民族自决的一方。如今，当中国以“后殖民团结”争夺全球南方时，Trump 的领土要求、武力恫吓与帝国怀旧，正在为对手提供宣传红利。总体趋势是：强制信号增强，却转化不成稳定控制力。
The article portrays Trump’s foreign policy as outdated “gunboat diplomacy”, defined by overestimating coercion and underestimating opponents’ resolve. On February 19th, days before war began, Steve Witkoff said the White House was “curious” that Iran had not capitulated despite America’s naval buildup. Iran then closed Hormuz to most shipping, and Washington was accused of being unprepared for that response, even as the Pentagon denied being surprised. The sequence suggests a repeated expectation of rapid capitulation followed by the opposite result.
A similar miscalculation appears in Venezuela. America captured Nicolás Maduro in January and installed Delcy Rodríguez, but the article says the White House had first assumed that bombing alleged drug-running boats would be enough to make Maduro yield. This reflects a recurring strategic assumption: increase bombing threats or short-run military pressure, and foreign leaders will behave as America wants. The author argues that this ignores ideology, nationalism and regime-survival logic, while Trump and his allies also treat 19th-century imperial expansion as a positive model, from Greenland to the western hemisphere.
The article further argues that both history and current geopolitics cut against this view. Europe’s empires did not collapse because of “wokeness”, but because post-war Europe was broke, colonial control became costlier, and nationalism surged in response. America, despite hypocrisy, at least tried during the Cold War to present itself as supporting self-determination. Now, when China competes for influence by invoking post-colonial solidarity, Trump’s territorial demands, military threats and imperial nostalgia hand rivals a propaganda gift. The overall trend is stronger coercive signalling with weak conversion into durable control.