作者进一步以时间序列追踪被中国民营与国有企业收购的标的公司。收购后，这些公司通常增加研发投入并转向更资本密集，但其专利申报增幅不显著，近似可以忽略；反而利润受挫，收购后 ROA 相比未被中国持有的对照组下降 1.1 个百分点。在对照组非中国持有企业平均 ROA 仅约 4% 的背景下，这种下跌比例上十分显著。研究在持股门槛上采取「至少 10%」为中文持有判准，因此如 Bang & Olufsen 15.1% 的伯利兹股东 New Sparkle Roll International Limited 与 Rio Tinto 14% 的新加坡股东 Shining Prospect PTE Ltd 也被归为关联中国。
该研究未能证明因果关系，仅展示了顺序：中国母公司先收购海外研发密集型公司；被收购公司 R&D 上升、短期专利平稳、ROA 下滑；而中国母公司在收购后专利申报快速增加。中国母公司尤其是国企，平均专利件数在报告年度末期可超过原先的四倍，且与其他国家外资模式相比，这种「先压低被收购方短期表现、再在母公司端获益」的模式更具中国特征。若此为真，技术转移便可能以绕开外国监管与税负的方式，转化为母公司本土的创新产出。
A team of researchers built a micro-level dataset of 161,773 firms across 159 countries and traced capital through offshore tax havens to ultimate owners, estimating this chain captures over 80% of global non-financial firm assets. They estimate Chinese investors control about $3.3 trillion in global corporate assets, with 42% concentrated in Europe and 38% in North America. After the launch of Made in China 2025, the knowledge-intensity of acquisition targets increased further. Roughly two-fifths of this outbound flow passed through at least one tax haven, and almost $800 billion went via the Cayman Islands, about half of China’s non-financial corporate assets in the dataset.
The authors then used longitudinal analysis on firms bought by Chinese private and state-owned enterprises. After acquisition, targets typically increased research and development and became more capital intensive, but patent growth was minimal and statistically insignificant. At the same time, profitability fell: average return on assets declined by 1.1 percentage points versus non-Chinese-owned controls over the same period. With non-Chinese-owned firms averaging about 4% ROA, this decline is substantial. Chinese ownership was defined as at least 10% stake, so partial-control cases like Bang & Olufsen (15.1% through New Sparkle Roll International Group Limited in Bermuda) and Rio Tinto (14% through Shining Prospect PTE LTD in Singapore linked to Aluminum Corporation of China) were included.
Causality is not proven, but the observed sequence is notable: Chinese parents first buy major stakes in developed-market firms; acquired firms show higher R&D, flat patents, and lower ROA; Chinese parents then see sharp domestic patent gains, with Chinese SOEs seeing an average fourfold jump versus tripling overall. Compared with other countries’ outward investment patterns, this appears unusual for China. The article proposes this may reflect state-driven strategy: temporary target-level performance costs to internalize global technological capacity. In that view, acquisition returns may appear as home-country innovation rather than as higher patenting by the acquired firms, potentially easing oversight and tax exposure.