在阿罗约纳兰霍（Arroyo Naranjo）一早，Javier（27岁）和其父 Elías（64岁）形容了能源与民生压力的日常化：家中停电超过16小时，水泵未能输送导致水箱空空，厨具与交通也因缺油失效。当晚的公共运输失灵，与其在周末应到的革命武装预备役训练相关，显示燃料缺口已直接影响军事动员与民用出行；该地区在此类情况下常见长达12到20小时的每日停电。更广泛而言，黑市与物流断裂加重了饥饿与卫生恶化的风险，尤其在夏季高温下，垃圾堆积与睡眠品质下降进一步恶化体感压力。这一情境发生在美国自2026年2月推进对古巴施压并于1月后接续加强封锁的背景下，属于高压期的典型社会性冲击。

古巴有9.7百万人口，且自2020年以来经济萎缩超过15%。全国有16座热电厂，其中6座停摆，其中2座为最大发电机组；这使得基础供电能力受损，晚间高峰时段曾有近64%地区仍陷入停电。能源结构上，近两年古巴对委内瑞拉依赖度仍高，逾50%油品需求曾由委方供应；2025年后段估算约为30,000桶/日（约4,770立方公尺/日）。自12月以来，最后一批约598,000桶（约95,180 m³）到岸，再加上马德罗逮捕后一周内墨西哥 Pemex 供应的84,900桶（约13,507 m³），都只是短期存续余量；总计约682,900桶（约108,700 m³）。克林姆普尔（Kpler）评估其石油储备处于关键危急，政策推演空间只剩两条路：谈判解除封锁，或接受长期经济瘫痪。

在政治控制面向，2015年以前网路扩张打破官方垄断，但2021年抗议冲突（1死、逾1,000名政治犯）后，当局转向更高压监控。资讯服务由唯一通讯商 ETECSA 涨价：每月360古巴比索（约25 CP?；原文为$1.25）可用6GB，续用每3GB加收3,360比索（约7.55美元），约为退休金2,075比索的1.62倍、超过国营员工平均月薪6,506比索的51.6%；而平均每人原先月用量为10GB，已明显下降。Prisoners Defenders 报告称88%受访者表示其网路行为曾被拿来作为传票、逮捕或讯问依据；Aroni Yanko 因社群贴文入狱1年6个月，Mayelín Rodríguez Prado 因脸书贴文判刑15年，亦是典型证据。未来若与美方谈判，网路与粮食将成核心交换项目之一，因为能源与资讯双重收缩已同步压缩了社会韧性与抗议组织能力。

In early January in Arroyo Naranjo, Javier (27) and his father Elías (64) described shortages that had become routine: more than 16 hours without electricity, no water pumping to neighborhood tanks, limited fuel for cooking and transport, and missed mandatory reserve training because buses never arrived. Daily blackouts are commonly 12–20 hours, and in this case the outage also disrupted military mobilization logistics as much as household life. In a broader context, these conditions occur after U.S. pressure accelerated in February 2026, with electricity, sanitation, and mobility failures now directly shaping daily survival and social behavior in Cuba’s capital periphery.

Cuba has 9.7 million people and has seen its economy contract by more than 15% since 2020. The island has 16 thermoelectric plants; six are offline, including two of the largest generating units, and late-afternoon peaks have left nearly 64% of the country without power. For nearly two years, over 50% of Cuba’s oil needs depended on Venezuela; late 2025 shipments were around 30,000 barrels per day (about 4,770 m³/day). The last arrivals after Maduro’s capture amounted to 598,000 barrels (about 95,180 m³), plus 84,900 barrels (about 13,507 m³) from Mexico’s Pemex a week later—about 682,900 barrels total (about 108,700 m³). According to Kpler, reserves were in critical condition, forcing the regime toward either negotiating with Trump or accepting further economic paralysis.

Internet policy and repression are converging with the same scarcity logic. Cuba’s sole telecom operator ETECSA has raised data costs: 360 Cuban pesos (about $1.25) for 6 GB per month, but 3,360 pesos (about $7.55) for only 3 extra GB, or 1.62 times the monthly pension (2,075 pesos) and about 52% of average state wages (6,506 pesos). Average use was previously 10 GB, now reduced as users cannot afford it. Since the 2021 protests (1 death, over 1,000 political prisoners), digital control has intensified; Prisoners Defenders reports 88% of respondents said authorities used online activity to justify summonses, arrests, or interrogations. Cases include 1 year 6 months, 15 years, and 1 year 4 months in prison for social-media posts. Any future deal is therefore likely to center on oil access, food, and internet access, since both energy and communication infrastructure now underwrite regime stability and social containment.