过去一周，国际货币基金组织（IMF）停止了在春季会议上讨论全球经济预测，改为发布一个“参考预测”（reference forecast），并配套给出若干备选情景，体现出对近期局势的“搁置式”处理。若伊朗停火维持，短期全球经济伤害可控；若停火失败、冲突重燃或升级，代价将明显更高。文章认为，这种短期情景推演往往掩盖更关键的长期含义：无论伊朗战争如何在近期落幕，这场剧烈扰动都显示全球秩序正在转向，不再以美国主导合作为核心。

接着，文章指出国际合作的关键价值在于降低成本，尤其体现在防务、金融和贸易上。过去一年，北约（NATO）信心大幅下降；联盟原本通过共同防务分担成本并提高效率，但特朗普政府既批评欧洲国家长期搭便车，也未真正促成其“公平分摊”，反而加剧了联盟损耗。若伙伴不愿分担负担，美国要推进本就全球化的安全目标将更加昂贵——霍尔木兹海峡（Strait of Hormuz）事件就是警示。美元体系同样是一种公共品，美国的“exorbitant privilege”是其最突出收益；若地缘政治碎片化并走向多极化，美元主导地位被削弱，交易成本、流动性和金融稳定性风险都将上升。

更高成本还体现在从全球化转向“管理型贸易”的路径上。即便贸易不会终结，越是频繁、越是干预式的贸易导向，就越会抬高国内生产者成本、抑制投资，并推高财政支出（如美国对农业等部门的补贴和受冲击方补偿）。IMF财政监测还显示，全球财政压力持续加深：许多地区公共债务仍高于疫情高峰，预算赤字在低失业环境下仍然偏高，利率也在上升。美国更突出，IMF口径下美国一般政府赤字维持在GDP的约7%到8%，且尚无债务整合方案。再叠加碎片化秩序带来的持续军费、债务服务与管理型贸易支出，以及由此引致的成本上升与增速放缓，较可能出现的是增长放缓；一旦触及金融脆弱和财政压力临界点，突然性的挫折与更大衰退风险也会抬头。

Last week the IMF abandoned publishing global forecasts for its spring meetings and instead released a reference forecast with alternative scenarios, which amounted to a muddle-through approach for the near term. If the Iran ceasefire holds, short-term global damage is manageable; if it fails and the war resumes or escalates, the economic cost is much worse. The article argues that this short-run scenario exercise can conceal the deeper implication: regardless of how the Iran conflict is settled in coming weeks, the current shock signals a global order shift away from U.S.-led cooperation.

The article then argues that cooperation matters most because it lowers costs, especially in defense, finance and trade. NATO confidence has fallen sharply over the last year; alliances can share defense burdens, but the Trump administration both criticized European free-riding and avoided rebuilding the burden-sharing bargain, further weakening the alliance. If partners do not help carry the load, U.S. global security goals become more expensive, as the Strait of Hormuz episode illustrates. The dollar system is also a public good with strong U.S. gains from its “exorbitant privilege”; if geopolitical fragmentation weakens dollar primacy in a move toward multipolarity, transaction costs, liquidity conditions, and financial stability risks likely rise.

Higher costs also emerge in the shift from globalization to managed trade. Even if trade continues to expand, increasingly interventionist trade steering tends to raise producer costs, suppress investment, and raise public spending through subsidies and compensation for collateral damage (for example, in U.S. agriculture). IMF fiscal analysis adds a fiscal warning: global public debt in many places remains above the Covid peak, deficits stay high despite low unemployment, and interest rates have increased. For the U.S., the IMF’s general-government deficit remains around 7% to 8% of GDP with no clear debt-consolidation strategy. Layering this on top of persistent spending from strategic fragmentation—defense, debt service and managed trade, plus higher costs and slower growth—makes sluggish growth the base case and raises the risk that combined financial fragility and fiscal stress produce a sharper setback.