2026年3月6日,彭博报道,美国商务部官员拟定规则要求几乎所有由Nvidia、AMD及其同业出口的AI加速器都需美国批准,将监管从约40个受限目的地扩展到几乎全球的许可制度。若被采纳,外国企业——在某些情形下是其政府——若用于构建AI训练与推理基础设施需获准进口芯片。该机制被视为美国将计算能力供应置于华盛顿的闸门化管理。Nvidia股价盘中下跌最多1.9%,AMD下跌2.3%。出口不超过1,000块GB300 GPU的交易将接受较简化审查并有部分豁免,而更大规模部署则需预先清关许可。
若单一公司在单一国家持有超过200,000块GB300 GPU的集群,需征得东道国政府批准,许可可能附加安全承诺与匹配美国AI投资等条件,但草案据称未披露固定比例。一个对比案例是NScale拟向Microsoft提供的200,000块GPU,分布于美国与欧洲四个站点,并被称为最大全球AI基础设施合同之一。政府内多名官员称草案尚未定稿,可能被实质性修改或搁置;商务部也表示不会回到拜登时代的AI扩散框架,后者曾被批评为过度限制。
该规则也可能成为更广泛外交与贸易博弈工具:许可拖延或条件收紧将扰乱大型项目时间表,反之若快速放行则基础设施建设可基本照常推进。该行政当局此前已对阿联酋与沙特达成附带预期的协议,在阿联酋情形中还出现了1:1投资条件。围绕China,报道曾提及每家中国客户75,000块H200芯片的上限情景,同时在武器相关管控下约20个国家仍受实质性禁运。该提案还旨在提高全球可见性并防止芯片向中国转移——这是此前马来西亚和泰国管控背景下长期关注的问题,并可能把限制某些厂商向Chinese AI企业提供算力服务的许可条款进一步延展。
On March 6, 2026, Bloomberg reported that US Commerce Department officials have drafted rules to require U.S. approval for almost all exports of AI accelerators from Nvidia, AMD and peers, potentially extending controls from roughly 40 restricted destinations to nearly global permitting. If adopted, foreign firms—and in some cases their governments—would need authorization to import chips used to build AI training and inference infrastructure, effectively making Washington a gatekeeper for AI compute. The market reacted immediately: Nvidia fell as much as 1.9% and AMD fell 2.3%. Shipments of up to 1,000 GB300 GPUs would receive simpler review with some exemptions, while larger deployments would require preclearance.
For deployments above 200,000 GB300 GPUs held by one company in one country, host-government approval would be required, and licenses could be conditioned on security assurances and matching U.S. AI investment commitments, though no fixed ratio is disclosed. NScale’s planned 200,000-GPU supply to Microsoft across four sites in the U.S. and Europe is cited as a benchmark, described as one of the largest AI infrastructure contracts. Officials said the draft remains fluid and may be substantially revised or shelved, and Commerce reiterated it will not revert to Biden-era AI-diffusion rules, which critics once labeled overreaching.
The framework could also become a diplomacy and trade tool: slower licensing or stricter terms could disrupt large project timelines, while rapid clearances would keep buildouts mostly intact. The administration already linked UAE and Saudi deals to broader expectations, with a 1:1 investment condition reported in the UAE case. On China-linked controls, reports referenced potential caps such as 75,000 H200 chips per Chinese customer, while about 20 countries remain under effective bans in arms-related controls. The proposal is also aimed at better global visibility and preventing chip diversion to China, after prior concerns in Malaysia and Thailand, and could extend licensing terms that restrict firms from providing computing services to Chinese AI companies.