Donald Trump 的伊朗战争显示出反转。特朗普在第二任期一年后发起“无限期”军事行动后，欧洲不再只是被动承载，反而因其基地、空域和后勤而具备实际杠杆。文章指出，二战后美国向中东投射力量长期依赖德国 Ramstein、英国 RAF Fairford、西班牙 Rota 和 Morón 以及盟友上空通行权。尽管北大西洋公约组织（NATO）加深了欧洲对华盛顿的安全依赖，但分析人士认为，美国若无欧洲提供燃油、弹药、驻军基地和运输通道，就难以对伊朗进行快速且持久的作战。
欧洲领导人最初只给予有限公开配合，并大体抵制进攻性打击。Starmer 与 Sánchez 均拒绝承担进攻性角色，伦敦和马德里也要求合法性与战略依据：Starmer 强调必须有法律基础和可执行方案，Macron 与 Meloni 重申国际法考量，Mark Carney 也从更广泛法治框架提出警示。这与旧模式不同；以2003年伊拉克战争为例，当时华盛顿曾数月游说盟友。特朗普起初几乎未与盟友磋商即开战，随后以贸易施压与威胁加码，因此欧洲舆论反弹明显；在柏林等地，政府将对特朗普的公开斥责与幕后沟通区分开来。
牵引效应已不限于外交。即便不直接参战，欧洲也因防务、拦截与区域安全外溢而被卷入：土耳其的一支 NATO 小队拦截了伊朗弹道导弹，意大利讨论向海湾国家提供防御援助，乌克兰则提出无人机对抗专长。Mark Rutte 指出伊朗正成为欧洲邻近威胁，而 NATO 物流负责人 Ben Hodges 强调，仅依靠 Fort Bragg 或 Fort Hood 无法保卫美国。欧洲仍高度依赖美国安全而避免彻底决裂，但官员普遍把 Greenland、关税、对俄让步到伊朗打击这类反复“要么配合要么受压”的循环视为升级：每一轮危机都提高后续让步成本，使欧洲对特朗普的“Yes”越来越难，关系也更具交易性。
Donald Trump's Iran war shows a reversal. After years of complaints that Europe was complacent under the US security umbrella, Europe now has practical leverage as a one-year-into-second-term open-ended campaign depends on European bases, airspace and logistics. Since World War II, U.S. power projection to the Middle East has long relied on hubs like Ramstein, RAF Fairford, Rota and Morón, as well as allied overflight routes. Although NATO deepens European dependence on Washington, analysts say the U.S. cannot conduct quick and sustained operations in Iran without allied support for fuel, munitions, basing and transit.
European leaders initially offered limited public cooperation and broadly resisted offensive strikes. Starmer and Sánchez both refused offensive roles, while London and Madrid demanded legal and strategic justification: Starmer required a lawful basis and a viable plan, Macron and Meloni reiterated legality concerns, and Mark Carney also warned from a broader rule-of-law perspective. This differs from older practice; in the 2003 Iraq War, Washington spent months lobbying allies. Trump launched with little consultation, then escalated through trade pressure and threats, so public backlash in Europe became clear. In Berlin and elsewhere, governments separated public rebukes of Trump from behind-the-scenes coordination.
The pull-in effect now extends beyond diplomacy. Even without direct participation, Europe is being drawn in through defense, interception and regional-security spillovers: a NATO battery in Turkey intercepted an Iranian ballistic missile, Italy discussed sending defensive aid to Gulf states, and Ukraine offered drone-countermeasure expertise. Mark Rutte said Iran is becoming a threat to Europe, while Ben Hodges, a NATO logistics figure, said the U.S. could not be defended from Fort Bragg or Fort Hood alone. Europe still depends heavily on U.S. security and avoids a full rupture, yet officials increasingly view the recurring cycle from Greenland, tariffs, concessions to Russia, then Iran strikes as escalation, with each crisis increasing the cost of future acquiescence and making support for Trump less automatic and more transactional.