由2025年6月12天战争塑造的作战模式，2026年3月的伊朗冲突已进入高强度阶段：美国与以色列在一周多时间内实施了协调进攻，据报道打击了伊朗数千个目标，削弱了导弹发射装置、指挥网络和通信体系，并击毙高级指挥官。文中引用的人权数据称平民死亡超过1,000人。伊朗继续以反击方式，在地区内持续发射导弹和无人机，暴露了联军防御中的漏洞。因此，该战役同时实现了对伊朗作战基础设施的摧毁，并在伊朗边界之外维持持续压力。

2025年的战略经验使其更重视打击发射人员和指挥节点而非单纯摧毁导弹本体：导弹本身可埋藏、加固或分散，但发射人员更难掩护也难以替代。美国官员称，德黑兰的发射装置已被摧毁超过90%，从而对弹道攻击形成瓶颈。伊朗在2025年高峰期向以色列发射了超过500枚弹道导弹，在2026年战争前八天发射超过650枚，然而大量导弹打在空置基地上，因为美以在前期提前执行了“get off the X”预防式撤离部署。伊朗也在适应：在去年遭遇高级指挥官死亡与通信中断后，其体系似乎去中心化，并且在Ali Khamenei被杀后的八天内，Mojtaba Khamenei被任命为继任者。

德黑兰也转向更便宜、可大规模投入的单向攻击无人机，尤其是Shahed-136；到第1周结束时，这种武器在其整体发射中占比最高，使其在更复杂武器受压制时仍能持续区域性打击。以色列总体上拦截了这些来袭，但拦截弹成本远高于目标无人机成本，凸显了在分散地区目标下的防御负担。美方脆弱性仍在扩大：地区设施受损，科威特击毙美国军人6人，美国一套价值US$300 million的THAAD雷达在约旦被摧毁，卡塔尔的一部预警雷达也被击中。文章认为美国虽去除了许多战场节点，但战略终局仍不明朗：战争理由似乎已从削弱伊朗军事机器扩展到更广泛的以政权目标为核心的诉求。

A campaign shaped by the June 2025 twelve-day war has entered a high-intensity phase in March 2026: the U.S. and Israel carried out a coordinated offensive for just over a week, reportedly striking thousands of Iranian targets, degrading missile launchers, command networks, and communications, and killing senior commanders. Human-rights figures cited in the article put civilian deaths at more than 1,000. Iran kept retaliating with repeated missile and drone attacks across the region, revealing gaps in coalition defenses. The campaign therefore combines destruction of Iran’s war-making infrastructure with sustained pressure beyond Iran’s borders.

Strategic learning from 2025 made attacks on launch crews and command nodes more central than chasing missiles alone: missiles can be buried, hardened, or dispersed, while crews are harder to protect and harder to replace. U.S. officials said more than 90% of Tehran’s launchers were destroyed, creating a bottleneck for ballistic attacks. Iran fired more than 500 ballistic missiles during the 2025 surge and more than 650 in the first eight days of the 2026 war, yet many landed on vacated bases because U.S. and Israeli forces pre-positioned and moved assets through a “get off the X” approach. Iran has adapted too: after commander deaths and communications disruption last year, its system appears decentralized, and eight days after Ali Khamenei was killed, Mojtaba Khamenei was named successor.

Iran also shifted to cheaper, mass-producible one-way attack drones, especially Shahed-136; by the end of week one these were its most widely launched system, allowing continued regional strikes as more sophisticated weapons were suppressed. Israel largely intercepted them, but interceptor costs were far higher than the drones themselves, highlighting a major defense burden across dispersed regional targets. U.S. vulnerabilities have continued to grow: facilities in the region were damaged, six U.S. soldiers were killed in Kuwait, a US$300 million THAAD radar was destroyed in Jordan, and an early-warning radar in Qatar was also hit. The article argues that while the U.S. has removed many battlefield nodes, the end-state remains unclear, with stated goals appearing to shift from degrading Iran’s military machine to broader regime-focused objectives.