波罗的海三国正于超过 1,000 公里边界上构筑 30 公里缓冲带，强化壕沟、堡垒、障碍物与军事设施，以在入侵初期减速俄军并维持 NATO 支援意愿。立陶宛首都维尔纽斯仅距白俄罗斯 30 公里，若全面撤离须经三条主路线疏散 60 万人；2024 年发放至少 150,000 本民防手册，仅 10 人报名演练，反映社会备战度偏低。当地测试疏散、基础设施防护与民兵动员，并强调 72 小时存粮、自救技能与 “Hour X” 应变，以避免重演 2022 年基辅交通瘫痪等混乱情境。
拉脱维亚边境地区在 2024 年平均薪资低于 €1,300，人口外移与孤立加深对里加的不信任。政府投入 €300 百万建防御带与 €640 百万经济与基建方案，但 470 公里长的加固区引发土地征用疑虑与政商不信任。靠近白俄边界的村镇俄语资讯流量高，VPN、Telegram 与俄媒影响持续，使“戈,拉特加莱!”等地方民粹力量在 2024 年市政选举中夺下达 14/15 席位。虚假资讯（如不存在的地雷伤亡谣言）强化社会不安，使政府边境强化政策面临心理与政治阻力。
爱沙尼亚边境多次遭遇 GPS 干扰、空域侵犯、浮标移位与“混合战”行动，并出现俄军于“萨策靴”区域被目击等事件，使首都民众中三分之一表示常感焦虑。爱沙尼亚拆除苏联象征、限缩俄语教育与官方俄语使用，引发俄语占多数的纳尔瓦居民感受被边缘化。边境桥梁封闭、移民冲击与资讯战使地方认同受创；居民视从双向城市到“死巷”的转变为身分断裂。俄乌战争蔓延效应迫使三国同步强化军事、基建、社会韧性与心理防护。
The Baltic states are fortifying a 30-kilometer buffer zone along more than 1,000 kilometers of frontier, constructing trenches, bunkers, and obstacles to slow a potential Russian advance and preserve NATO’s willingness to intervene. Vilnius lies only 30 kilometers from Belarus; a full evacuation would require moving 600,000 people through three main routes. In 2024, at least 150,000 civil-defense manuals were distributed, yet only 10 people registered for drills, revealing low preparedness. Authorities conduct evacuation tests, infrastructure-defense rehearsals, and militia mobilizations, emphasizing 72-hour supplies, self-aid and “Hour X” response to avoid 2022-Kyiv-style gridlock.
Latvia’s border regions recorded average 2024 wages below €1,300, with out-migration and isolation fueling distrust of Riga. The government allocated €300 million for a 470-kilometer defense belt and €640 million for infrastructure and economic programs, yet eminent-domain concerns and poor services complicate acceptance. Russian-language media access via VPNs and platforms like Telegram sustains Kremlin influence; in the 2024 municipal elections, a local populist party captured 14 of 15 seats in Daugavpils. Disinformation, including false claims of landmine deaths, amplifies insecurity and heightens resistance to fortification.
Estonia faces repeated hybrid attacks—GPS jamming, airspace violations, buoy removal, and sightings of Russian personnel—contributing to rising “war anxiety,” with one-third of surveyed residents reporting frequent concern. Removal of Soviet symbols and reductions in Russian-language services have left Russian-speaking majorities in Narva feeling marginalized. Border closures, migration pressure, and information warfare eroded cross-border identity, turning a once-integrated region into a “dead end.” The Ukraine war’s spillover compels all three states to reinforce military posture, civil infrastructure, societal cohesion, and psychological resilience.