数据显示了明确的贸易代价：五角大厦称自2023年11月到2024年6月，Houthis 对军事与商船的攻击超过190次。船商改走好望角，绕道上千英里，使航程相比红海—苏伊士捷径最长增加25%，并伴随更高的保险费。IMF-Oxford 的统计显示，该海峡2023年日均约75艘船，降至2025年的约33艘。加剧前，该水道大约承载了约9%的全球海运贸易，包含约20%的集装箱流量，以及每年超过2兆美元（US$2,000,000,000,000+）的货物。
若 Houthis 再次实施行动，冲击可能更大，因霍尔木兹目前已受限。沙乌地阿拉伯仰赖通往 Yanbu 的沙漠管道，再由 Bab el-Mandeb 向南过境；Yanbu 装载量约占沙乌地战前石油出口的70%，对抑制油价再上涨有关键作用。虽然 Houthis 并非完全由德黑兰直接指挥，但他们透过走私网路与本土制造已重建能力，同时仍获得来自伊朗的训练与武器。扩大开战将面临重大报复风险，而也门经济脆弱，约50%人口处于急性饥饿。也曾有超过20国参与的美方主导任务 Operation Prosperity Guardian 进行航道护卫，但后续护航已缩减，分析人士仍警告伊朗压力可能把袭击推向沙乌地相关油品运输。
Since the Strait of Hormuz has been largely shut by the Iran war, Saudi Arabia’s exports to Asia increasingly rely on the Red Sea via Bab el-Mandeb. The Houthis throttled this corridor for about two years since late 2023, and concern rose after Tasnim News on March 25 warned that an Iran-linked front could reopen. The Houthis then fired missiles at Israel and said operations would continue until attacks on Iran and its proxies ended. Repeated strikes by the United States, Israel, the UK, and a Saudi-led coalition weakened them but did not destroy the group, so many ship operators still avoid Yemeni waters.
The trade cost is clear. The Pentagon says Houthis attacked military and commercial vessels more than 190 times between November 2023 and June 2024. Operators have rerouted ships thousands of miles around the Cape of Good Hope, making voyages up to 25% longer than the Red Sea–Suez shortcut, and raising insurance costs. IMF-Oxford data show traffic of about 75 vessels per day in 2023, dropping to about 33 per day in 2025. Before the surge, Bab el-Mandeb carried about 9% of global seaborne trade, including about 20% of container traffic and more than US$2 trillion in goods annually.
If Houthis resume aggressive actions, the impact is likely larger because Hormuz remains constrained. Saudi Arabia depends on a pipeline to Yanbu and then passage through Bab el-Mandeb to ship crude; loadings at Yanbu are about 70% of prewar Saudi oil exports, helping keep oil prices from rising further. The Houthis are not fully controlled by Tehran but have rebuilt capacity through smuggling networks and local manufacture while still receiving training and weapons from Iran. Escalation into broader war carries major retaliation risk, and Yemen’s economy is weak, with around 50% of the population in acute hunger. Security for the route has shifted from the earlier multinational Operation Prosperity Guardian, which involved over 20 countries, toward reduced escort levels, and analysts still warn Iran’s pressure could push attacks toward Saudi-linked oil flows.