这一过程因采购机制被显著加速而更快：整车企业将招标频率从多年一轮压缩到每月，层层反复压价。BYD的每车平均售价从2021年的143,100元降至去年119,223元；Nio的ES8旗舰车自2018年后约下降20%，同时加大技术含量并本地化零部件。供应链放量后成本下降并未带来高利润——黄宪称其订单毛利接近零，跨国同行也同样受挤压，LEM净利率从2022年3月财年的19.4%降到去年的2.7%。与此同时，美国仍长期面临巨额经常账户赤字与财政约束，IMF/世界银行春季会议把结构性再平衡问题推到前台。
宏观和政策支撑使这种竞争格局持续。中国上年经常账户顺差达GDP的3.7%，IMF估计人民币真实有效汇率低估约16%；2025年贸易顺差超10,000亿美元，且2026年1-3月货物出口同比增长近15%。然而产能过剩与地方博弈同样突出：我国太阳能产能达1,200吉瓦，几乎是去年全球装机647吉瓦的两倍；前六大上市太阳能企业预计2025年合计亏损430亿元人民币，即使Jinko Solar在2025年前半年获得13亿元补贴仍亏损30亿元，Trina也拿到数亿级补贴。汽车出口同比增长21%至1,420亿美元，锂离子电池出货达770亿美元；太阳能电池出口量增长73%，但总值却下滑8%至280亿美元。面对这种环境，欧盟和东南亚进口分别同比上涨21.1%和20.5%，中国企业一方面把产能外销（如Volkswagen和LEM都在其供应链内重组），另一方面仍在“内卷”零和竞争中寻求缓冲。
China’s latest manufacturing wave is reshaping advanced industries through the same logic as the original China shock. Huang Xian’s EV current-leakage sensor for Mega-Senway, initially a niche, has moved from about 20,000 units in 2019 to a projected 10 million this year. Imported European equivalents once sold near RMB200 (about US$30), while Mega-Senway’s own product moved from 100 RMB to margins of 40 RMB originally to as low as RMB10, showing a wider pattern of fierce domestic competition, scale and subsidies pulling margins down across EVs, batteries, wind and solar.
The speed has intensified as procurement is run in recurring monthly rounds of price compression. One automaker removed intermediaries and now reopens tendering repeatedly; BYD’s average selling price fell from RMB143,100 in 2021 to RMB119,223 last year, and Nio cut the flagship ES8 by about 20% from its 2018 launch while adding technology and domesticising parts. Larger volumes have reduced supply-chain costs but not profits: Huang says supplier margins are near zero, and foreign peers face the same pressure. LEM’s net income margin dropped from 19.4% in the year to March 2022 to 2.7% last year. The broader imbalance is global—America still carries a large current-account deficit and fiscal strain, so IMF and World Bank discussions now centre on structural rebalancing.
Policy and finance reinforce this trajectory. China’s current-account surplus was 3.7% of GDP last year, and the IMF estimates the real effective exchange rate is about 16% undervalued; the goods trade surplus exceeded US$1tn in 2025, with exports up nearly 15% year-on-year in Q1 2026. Yet overcapacity and local-competition distortions are severe. Solar manufacturing capacity rose to 1,200GW versus 647GW global installations last year; the top six listed Chinese solar firms expect cumulative losses of RMB43bn in 2025, even with Jinko Solar taking RMB1.3bn in subsidies in H1 and still losing RMB3bn. Vehicle exports rose 21% to $142bn and lithium-ion battery shipments to $77bn, while solar-cell shipment value fell 8% to $28bn despite 73% volume growth. Export growth was also concentrated in the EU (+21.1%) and Southeast Asia (+20.5%), illustrating how global supply chains are being re-priced, not just relocated.