四年战争显示俄罗斯的军事推进与战略目标严重失配：与1941至1945年红军从莫斯科到柏林推进1,600公里相比，当前在顿涅茨克主轴仅推进60公里，而且前线周边10至30公里“杀伤区”使兵力与装备难以集结并扩大战果。尽管战争仍在持续，战场数据趋势表明俄军突破能力在下降而非上升。

人力与财政指标也在同步恶化：到去年底，俄军伤亡已超过征募补充，自2025年6月起平均签约奖金再增50万卢布至243万卢布（约32,000美元），反映招募成本持续上升。仅兵员激励等相关年度支出就达5.1万亿卢布，约相当于联邦预算赤字的90%，同时非军工经济收缩、债务偿付上升、油收前景走弱，显示战争机器正以更高边际成本运转。

和谈前景在数字上同样不利于俄方“体面退出”：所谓12万亿美元“和平红利”被描述为空洞，而美国对战争融资已下降99%，削弱了通过单边施压乌克兰快速定案的路径。即便停火，国防开支已占俄罗斯GDP的8%，从战时向和平再配置资源与安置复员人员的冲击，叠加历史上退伍军人政治风险，意味着经济衰退与政局不稳概率上升。

Four years of war reveal a sharp mismatch between Russia’s military progress and strategic aims: compared with the Red Army’s 1,600km advance from Moscow to Berlin in 1941-45, Russia has moved only 60km in the main Donetsk axis, while a 10-30km drone-dominated “kill zone” prevents force concentration and exploitation. Although the war continues, battlefield metrics point to declining, not improving, breakthrough capacity.

Manpower and fiscal indicators are deteriorating in parallel: by the end of last year, Russian losses exceeded recruitment, and since June 2025 the average sign-on bonus rose another 0.5m roubles to 2.43m roubles (about $32,000), signaling a rising price for each recruit. The annual 5.1trn-rouble personnel bill alone equals about 90% of the federal budget deficit, while the non-war economy shrinks, debt-service burdens rise, and oil-revenue prospects weaken, showing a war machine running at higher marginal cost.

Peace dynamics are numerically unfavorable to a clean Russian exit: a touted $12trn “peace dividend” is portrayed as unrealistic, and US war financing has fallen by 99%, reducing leverage for a rapid one-sided settlement. Even with a deal, defense already at 8% of GDP implies that demobilization and resource reallocation, combined with Russia’s historical veteran-driven political risk, raise the probability of recession and instability.

Source: Vladimir Putin is caught in a vice of his own making

Subtitle: Russia’s president cannot win the war, but fears peace

Dateline: 2月 19, 2026 08:01 上午