预测市场已从小众走向主流：Kalshi 的年度交易量增长了 12 倍至 240 亿美元，这意味着前一年的规模约为 20 亿美元。部分合约在官方公告发布前、最终正确结果的价格曾跃升至 90% 以上，这一统计模式与知情交易者基于非公开信息操作相一致。

首个刑事案件凸显了问题规模：2 月 12 日，以色列称其逮捕了两名男子，指控其利用机密信息，通过押注对伊朗袭击的时间获利约 15 万美元。然而，美国法律通常允许在期货和预测合约中的知情交易，这不同于股票市场中为保护资本形成而禁止基于重大非公开信息交易的规则。

监管风险集中在两个可度量的渠道：一是信息披露本身有害的合约（例如军事行动或与并购相关的市场），二是交易者能够影响结果的市场，如 Polymarket 撤下的 Artemis II 爆炸合约。现有控制已要求身份核验和市场监测，而增加资金来源与雇主核验可提高识别率，同时受监管的在岸平台可通过银行转账、券商合作和机构资本实现规模扩张。

Prediction markets have moved from niche to mainstream: Kalshi’s annual trading volume jumped 12-fold to $24bn, implying roughly $2bn the prior year. Prices in some contracts rose above 90% for the eventual correct outcome just before official announcements, a statistical pattern consistent with informed traders acting on non-public information.

The first criminal case highlights the scale: on February 12, Israel said it arrested two men accused of using classified information to make about $150,000 by betting on the timing of an attack on Iran. Yet U.S. law generally permits informed trading in futures and prediction contracts, unlike equities where bans on trading material non-public information are meant to protect capital formation.

Regulatory risk concentrates in two measurable channels: contracts where disclosure itself is harmful (for example, military actions or M&A-linked markets) and markets where traders can influence outcomes, as in Polymarket’s withdrawn Artemis II explosion contract. Existing controls already require identity checks and market surveillance, and adding verification of fund sources and employers could raise detection rates while regulated onshore platforms scale through bank transfers, broker partnerships, and institutional capital.

Source: Why insider trading isn’t always bad

Subtitle: At least on prediction markets

Dateline: 2月 19, 2026 04:53 上午