文中证据显示人民币国际化同时有进展与限制：IMF 在 2010 年拒绝后，于 2015 年将人民币纳入储备货币篮子；北京也多年来向外国投资者开放债券市场，但全球采用幅度仍有限。尽管过去 12 个月人民币升值 5%，当局仍将其管理在狭窄交易区间内，并透过央行管制限制每日波动，从而限制完全可兑换性。同时，中国去年录得创纪录的 $1.2 trillion 贸易顺差；而在关税影响下对美出口走弱，出货转向 Europe、Africa、Latin America 与 Southeast Asia。
其含义是，「强大货币」较少关乎一次性的汇率水位，更多关乎在贸易计价、投资流动与储备使用上的持续功能，并可能使人民币未来与 euro、yen 同属美元之下的一个层级。作者警告，公信力需要长期一致的讯息，因为即便很小的修辞变化，也可能被视为重大政策讯号，正如美国先例所示。关键但书在于结构性因素：中国仍优先考虑出口竞争力，且未必愿意或有能力像 Federal Reserve 在近几十年 2 times 所做的那样提供全球流动性支撑；随著其外部顺差与市场重导趋势加剧，保护主义风险也在上升。
The column argues that China is trying to seize a strategic moment in early 2026, after President Donald Trump signaled tolerance for a weaker US dollar, by promoting Xi Jinping’s line that a “powerful” yuan serves national interest. It frames this against US messaging history, especially Robert Rubin’s disciplined “strong dollar” doctrine and Paul O’Neill’s 2001 misstep when he deviated, to show that currency signaling can move markets and political expectations. The core setup is that China’s economy is now far larger than it was a generation ago, so currency rhetoric is no longer symbolic and is tied to ambitions to reduce dollar dominance.
Evidence in the piece shows both progress and constraints in yuan internationalization: the IMF admitted the yuan into the reserve-currency basket in 2015 after rejecting it in 2010, and Beijing has spent years opening bond markets to foreign investors with only modest global uptake. Despite a 5% yuan appreciation over the last 12 months, authorities still manage it within a narrow trading band and cap daily volatility through central bank controls, limiting full convertibility. At the same time, China posted a record $1.2 trillion trade surplus last year, while exports to the US weakened under tariffs and shipments were redirected toward Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia.
The implication is that “powerful currency” is less about a one-off exchange-rate level and more about sustained functions in trade invoicing, investment flows, and reserve use, potentially placing the yuan in a future tier with the euro and yen beneath the dollar. The author warns that credibility requires message consistency over time, because even small rhetorical shifts can be treated as major policy signals, as in US precedent. Key caveats are structural: China still prioritizes export competitiveness, may not be willing or able to provide global liquidity backstops like the Federal Reserve has done 2 times in recent decades, and faces rising protectionism risk as its external surplus and market re-routing trends intensify.