尽管中国是全球第 2 大经济体，人民币（RMB）仍然只是较小的全球储备与融资货币：在 IMF 的 COFER 外汇储备构成表中排名第 7，且虽自 2016 年起被纳入 IMF 的 SDR 货币篮子，但在 2025 年第 3 季（Q3 2025）所通报的官方外汇（FX）储备中仅占 1.9%，相较之下美元为 57%、欧元为 20%（甚至澳币占比更高）。文章主张，「储备地位」往往是私部门不愿持有某种货币的副产品（促使央行去累积它），而真正的国际货币地位，更应以其作为跨境借贷之「负债货币」的使用程度来衡量。

以此衡量，美元仍居主导地位：在所有跨境债务中约占 50%（约 $23tn），在跨境可交易的债务证券中约占 55%（约 $14tn）；全球跨境借款规模约为全球储备资产存量的 3x，而美元的储备占比大致追踪其借款占比。中国的对外放贷历来以美元为主，即使在「一带一路」（Belt and Road Initiative）之下亦然（Horn、Reinhart、Trebesch 指出，约 3/4 的 BRI 放贷以美元计价），但最新数据显示出转向：截至 2025 年 11 月底（end-November 2025），中国机构的美元贷款为 $375bn（低于 2022 年的 $587bn），同时人民币放贷达到 $357bn，并且据报也在尝试允许陷入困境的借款方（例如肯亚 Kenya，且可能包括衣索比亚 Ethiopia）将美元债务转换为 RMB。

债券市场规模与市场基础设施仍是主要约束：在 2025 年全球超过 $9tn 的跨境证券发行中，只有 $25bn 来自外国实体在中国境内（onshore）的人民币市场发行，另有 $125bn 为在香港的离岸人民币发行。资本管制限制了跨境人民币证券的成长，而在中国约 $25tn 的债务市场中，发行人基础被视为不透明，使得「会计规则」（rule of accounting）成为要逼近甚至欧元国际化水准的硬性要求。最后，作为负债货币需要可信的国际最后贷款人（lender-of-last-resort）：联准会（Fed）在 2008 与 2020 扮演了该角色，因此若人民币要更大幅度担任此角色，意味著在恐慌时中国人民银行（PBoC）需为离岸人民币融资市场提供支持，而不仅是扩大贸易计价使用或在选择性案例中推进，例如赞比亚 Zambia 由中资矿企以 RMB 支付税收/权利金（tax/royalty payments）。

Despite China being the world’s 2nd-largest economy, the renminbi (RMB) is still a minor global reserve and financing currency: it ranks 7th in the IMF COFER reserve composition table and, while included in the IMF’s SDR basket since 2016, accounted for only 1.9% of reported official FX reserves in Q3 2025 versus 57% for the US dollar and 20% for the euro (with even the Australian dollar higher). The article argues that “reserve status” is often a byproduct of private-sector reluctance to hold a currency (prompting central banks to accumulate it), while true international currency status is better captured by its use as a liability currency for cross-border borrowing and lending.

On that metric the dollar remains dominant, at roughly 50% (about $23tn) of all cross-border debt and 55% (about $14tn) of cross-border tradeable debt securities; global cross-border borrowing is about 3x the stock of global reserve assets, and the dollar’s reserve share broadly tracks its borrowing share. China’s outward lending has historically been dollar-heavy even under the Belt and Road Initiative (about 3/4 of BRI lending denominated in dollars, per Horn, Reinhart, and Trebesch), but recent data show a shift: Chinese institutions’ dollar loans were $375bn through end-November 2025 (down from $587bn in 2022) while yuan lending reached $357bn, alongside reported efforts to let distressed borrowers (for example in Kenya, and possibly Ethiopia) convert dollar debts into RMB.

Bond-market scale and market infrastructure remain the main constraint: of more than $9tn in global cross-border securities issuance in 2025, only $25bn came from foreign entities issuing in China’s onshore RMB markets, plus $125bn of offshore RMB issuance in Hong Kong. Capital controls limit growth in cross-border RMB securities, and the issuer base in China’s roughly $25tn debt markets is seen as opaque, making “rule of accounting” a binding requirement to approach even the euro’s level of internationalisation. Finally, a liability currency needs a credible international lender-of-last-resort: the Fed played that role in 2008 and 2020, so a larger RMB role would imply the PBoC backing offshore RMB funding markets during panics, not just expanding usage in trade invoicing or selective cases like Zambia’s RMB tax/royalty payments by Chinese mining firms.