美国官员与知情人士勾勒出一套$250bn的算术，暗示TSMC必须承担大部分重任：其中包含TSMC先前承诺的$100bn美国设厂投资，TSMC的供应链约增加$30bn，其他台湾企业的扩张（如伺服器组装）预计成本不超过$20bn，仍留下约$100bn的缺口，被形容为「只有TSMC能填补」。TSMC已宣布在亚利桑那州投入$165bn，涵盖6座晶圆厂（fabs）、2座先进封装厂，以及1座研发（R&D）设施，第一座工厂将于2025年末开始量产；Howard Lutnick也描述了一项雄心，欲在Trump任期内把台湾40%的晶片供应链与生产带到美国。两位熟悉计划的人士称，TSMC还将再投资$100bn以兴建另外4座晶圆厂；另一项相关提案则主张，对美国客户（进口商）分配免关税进口配额，作为其在美国境内建置产能的交换。
该协议的运作机制取决于产能乘数：在建厂期间，企业可免关税进口相当于设施规划产能2.5x的产品；量产开始后，豁免配额为产能的1.5x。一位分析师表示，在以直接晶片进口为核心的狭义定义下，TSMC的$165bn可支撑免关税进口至2032年；但随著晶圆厂完工而失去2.5x的建设期乘数，2032年后将出现缺口，可能需要在2035年前再增建4座晶圆厂。土地与密度比较被用作间接证据：TSMC在亚利桑那州既有的1,100-acre土地旁又取得900 acres（该1,100-acre地块上有1座运转中的晶圆厂、1座已完成外壳的厂房，以及第3rd座正在施工），推算仍有约720 acres可用；若以每座晶圆厂约180 acres估算，可容纳再建4座。相较之下，Intel计划在俄亥俄州1,000 acres上兴建8座晶圆厂；另有估算指TSMC每座晶圆厂所需面积可能高出多达50%，而TSMC在台南于一处面积不到其亚利桑那州总土地25%的基地上，运行著超过15座晶圆厂。即便扩张，TSMC先前仍预测在2030年代初期，其最先进（2nm及以下）产能约30%在美国；台湾的副行政院长则称40%目标「impossible」。同时，贸易与执法层面的但书仍在：去年台湾对美国$198bn的出口中，仅$8.2bn属于独立的半导体，多数晶片是以嵌入形式进入在台湾、印度、south-east Asia或墨西哥等地组装完成的产品中，而专家怀疑进口商能否可靠申报嵌入式晶片的价值以供课税征收。
A US-Taiwan trade deal signed this week aligns Washington’s tariffs on Taiwanese exports with other major partners but leaves chips out, relying instead on a January understanding tied to a $250bn pledge for Taiwanese tech investment in the US in exchange for chip tariff exemptions. With limited public detail, analysts are trying to infer what the commitment means for Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), whose capex is forecast over the next 3 years to significantly exceed the $101bn spent over the past 3 years, and for US customers buying Nvidia- and Apple-related chips as US hyperscalers spend heavily on AI servers. An industry insider said fuller text may not be released until after Donald Trump meets Xi Jinping in Beijing in April, reflecting the geopolitical sensitivity around Taiwan.
US officials and people briefed on the matter have sketched a $250bn arithmetic that implies TSMC must do most of the heavy lifting: $100bn of prior TSMC US factory commitments are included, TSMC’s supply chain adds about $30bn, and other Taiwanese expansions such as server assembly are expected to cost no more than $20bn, leaving roughly a $100bn gap that “only TSMC could fill.” TSMC has already announced $165bn for Arizona covering 6 fabs, 2 advanced packaging plants, and 1 R&D facility, with volume production at the first plant starting in late 2025, while Howard Lutnick has described an ambition to bring 40% of Taiwan’s chip supply chain and production to America during Trump’s term. Two people familiar with the plans said TSMC would invest another $100bn to build 4 more fabs, and a related proposal would allocate tariff-free import quotas to US customers (the importers) in return for building onshore capacity.
The deal’s mechanics hinge on capacity multipliers: during construction, firms can import up to 2.5x a facility’s planned capacity tariff-free, and after production starts, the exemption quota is 1.5x capacity; one analyst said TSMC’s $165bn covers tariff-free imports through 2032 under a narrow definition focused on direct chip imports, but losing the 2.5x construction multiplier as fabs complete creates a post-2032 gap that could require 4 additional fabs by 2035. Land and density comparisons are used as circumstantial evidence: TSMC acquired 900 acres next to an existing 1,100-acre Arizona plot (with 1 operational fab, 1 completed shell, and a 3rd under construction), leaving an estimated 720 acres that could fit 4 more fabs at about 180 acres per fab; Intel, by contrast, plans 8 fabs on 1,000 acres in Ohio, and TSMC’s area per fab was estimated up to 50% larger, while TSMC runs more than 15 fabs in Tainan on a site less than 25% the size of its total Arizona land. Even with expansion, TSMC previously projected about 30% of its most advanced (2nm and below) capacity in the US in the early 2030s, and Taiwan’s vice premier called the 40% target “impossible,” while trade and enforcement caveats loom: only $8.2bn of Taiwan’s $198bn US exports last year were standalone semiconductors, most chips arrive embedded in assembled products made in places like Taiwan, India, south-east Asia, or Mexico, and experts doubt importers can reliably report embedded chip value for tariff collection.