文章指出，在华盛顿聚焦格陵兰议题之际，伊朗正经历严重内乱与镇压升级。自1979年革命以来规模最大的抗议爆发后，可信人权组织估计，近几周已有数千人被杀，可能高达5,000至10,000人。与此同时，一支以核动力航母“亚伯拉罕·林肯”号为核心、搭载近80架作战飞机的美军航母打击群正从南海驶向北阿拉伯海，显示美国具备迅速介入的军事态势。
作者梳理了可用的军事选项与规模。单一航母打击群即可投送显著战力，其舰载F/A-18战机可对伊朗防空系统、革命卫队指挥节点、警察与后勤网络以及能源设施实施精确打击；配套的巡洋舰与驱逐舰可先行发射射程约1,500英里的“战斧”巡航导弹削弱防空。空军方面，至少一个F-15E中队已进驻约旦，补给与加油力量可部署至印度洋的迪戈加西亚；卡塔尔乌代德基地亦具备起飞条件，但部分海湾国家可能犹豫放行。
除动能手段外，非动能选项同样广泛。美以可联合发动进攻性网络行动，针对能源、通信、军事指挥与无人机/导弹生产设施，并辅以信息行动，控制网络以压制政权、支持反对派协同。作者认为，相较格陵兰争论，中东的战略窗口更为关键；在伊朗政权承压之际，美国若行动，或是数十年来促成内部变局的最佳机会。
The article argues that while Washington debates Greenland, Iran faces acute internal unrest and escalating repression. After the largest protests since the 1979 revolution, credible human-rights groups estimate thousands killed in recent weeks—possibly 5,000 to 10,000. Meanwhile, a US carrier strike group centered on the nuclear-powered USS Abraham Lincoln, with nearly 80 embarked combat aircraft, is moving from the South China Sea to the North Arabian Sea, underscoring rapid intervention capability.
The author details the scale of military options. Even a single carrier strike group can deliver substantial power: carrier-based F/A-18s could precisely target Iranian air defenses, Revolutionary Guard command nodes, police and logistics networks, and energy infrastructure. Accompanying cruisers and destroyers could lead with Tomahawk land-attack missiles—about 1,500 miles in range—to degrade defenses. On the air side, at least one F-15E squadron has arrived in Jordan, with refueling and logistics support available from Diego Garcia; sorties from Qatar’s Al Udeid base are possible, though some Gulf states may hesitate.
Beyond kinetic action, non-kinetic tools are extensive. The US and Israel could conduct offensive cyber operations against energy systems, communications, military command-and-control, and drone and missile production, paired with information operations to control internet access—denying the regime while enabling opposition coordination. The author concludes that, compared with Greenland, the Middle East presents a more consequential strategic window; acting amid Iran’s vulnerability could be the best chance in decades to catalyze internal change.