私募投资巨头管理资产已从2008年的2000亿美元膨胀到3万亿美元，约增长15倍，阿波罗、黑石和KKR正试图把募资来源从机构和超高净值人群扩展到大众零售。它们通过面向未上市股权、不动产和私募信贷的新基金推进“民主化”，但这一增长叙事正遭遇流动性考验。

2月18日，蓝猫头鹰将仅16亿美元规模的零售基金OBDC II暂停计划赎回，改为出售资产并向全部投资者返还资金。尽管体量不大，该事件仍像“煤矿金丝雀”一样触发行业警报，年初以来约六家更大型上市私募管理人合计蒸发约1000亿美元市值。

争议核心在于“有限流动性”模型：投资者可按月或按季申请退出，但基金每季最多仅处理净资产值5%的赎回请求，超额部分按比例分配。该上限意味着最差情况下约5年完成组合变现，与传统私募基金清盘周期相当；若问题源于执行失误而非模型缺陷，过度收紧监管可能抑制零售资金进入私募市场，但高个位数年化回报承诺叠加非流动资产与流动性承诺的错配仍是主要尾部风险。

Private-investment giants have expanded assets under management from $200bn in 2008 to $3trn, about a 15x increase, and Apollo, Blackstone, and KKR are now trying to shift fundraising from institutions and the ultra-wealthy to the mass retail market. Their “democratisation” push through funds targeting unlisted equity, property, and private debt is now facing a liquidity stress test.

On February 18, Blue Owl halted planned withdrawals in OBDC II, a retail fund with only $1.6bn in assets, and moved to asset sales to return capital across investors. Despite its small size, the event acted as a canary, with about six larger listed private-investment managers losing a combined $100bn in market value since the start of the year.

The central fault line is the limited-liquidity design: investors can request monthly or quarterly exits, but the fund processes redemptions up to only 5% of NAV per quarter, with excess requests prorated. That cap implies a roughly five-year full liquidation at worst, similar to standard private-markets wind-down periods; if the failure was execution rather than model design, aggressive regulation could choke retail access, but promises of high-single-digit annual returns combined with illiquid holdings and liquidity offers remain the key tail risk.

Source: The right response to private-market dangers

Subtitle: Was a Blue Owl fund mismanaged, or did it reveal fundamental problems about the industry?

Dateline: 2月 26, 2026 04:26 上午