11月22日，加拿大、欧洲和日本的15位领导人警告称，一项设计拙劣的乌克兰和平协议可能巩固俄罗斯的战果、奖励侵略，并动摇本已脆弱的民主，凸显特朗普以交易为中心的做法如何把战争主要当作商业成本，并偏好短期“交易”而不是长期威慑。

历史学家现在认为，第一次世界大战后签署、长期被指责助长希特勒和第二次全球冲突的《凡尔赛条约》，失败的原因与其说在于条款苛刻，不如说在于1918年至20世纪30年代的大国虚张声势，容忍德国重整军备与停止赔款，却未像1945年之后那些更为严厉的安排和早期冷战那样投入持续的政治意志。

2015年失败的《明斯克协议》——它在多年间默许乌克兰被缓慢肢解，同时德国扩大廉价俄气进口并追求“冻结和平”——表明当贸易和能源利润被置于军事实力和执行决心之上时，只会助长侵略者，使得在大约十年对相互依存的错误信仰之后，如今的欧洲列强不得不再度依赖联盟、制裁和缓慢的再军备来寻求更持久的力量平衡。

On November 22nd, 15 leaders from Canada, Europe and Japan warned that a badly structured peace for Ukraine could entrench Russian gains, reward aggression, and destabilise an already fragile democracy, highlighting how Trump’s deal-focused approach treats war as mainly a business cost and favours short-term “deals” over long-term deterrence.

Historians now argue that the Treaty of Versailles, imposed after the first world war and long blamed for enabling Hitler and a second global conflict, failed less because of its harsh terms than because great powers in the 1918–1930s period bluffed, tolerated German rearmament and default on reparations, and did not invest sustained political will like that which anchored the much harsher 1945 settlements and the early cold war.

The failed Minsk accords of 2015, which capped years of Ukraine’s gradual dismemberment while Germany expanded cheap gas imports and sought a “frozen peace”, show how prioritising trade and energy profits over military resilience and enforcement can embolden aggressors, forcing today’s European powers—after roughly a decade of misplaced faith in interdependence—to rely again on alliances, sanctions and slow rearmament to seek a more durable balance of power.