中国对高市早苗涉台言论采取多项报复，包括11月14日劝阻赴日旅游、要求航空公司减班、以及11月28日取消滨崎步与大槻真希在上海的演出。但这些措施呈区域性影响：关西受冲击最重，因该地区对中国游客依赖度高、关西机场中国航班预计12月将减少约30%。相比之下，东京羽田机场仅小幅减班，因削减航线可能导致长期无法重新获得宝贵的起降时刻，对中国国有航司利润构成不利。在东北地区，影响微弱；东北外籍旅客主要来自台湾，每日往返仙台与台湾至少有两班直航，旅馆入住率因台客逗留2晚以上而维持高位。
东北自2011年灾后与台湾形成稳固友好关系，使地区旅游结构更加多元化，并吸引来自东南亚、欧美的游客流向温泉（如银山温泉）与松岛湾等景点。因此，中国政府的限游措施未造成明显冲击。与此同时，中国对日商界传递出“维持经贸合作”的暗信号，包括中国驻日大使吴江浩主动会见经团联会长与跨党派友华议员，以维持企业信心。北京亦未取消日本旅客30天免签待遇，以避免外资撤退与供应链受扰。这反映出在国内经济低迷、消费与就业压力沉重背景下，北京不愿实施会反噬自身经济的制裁。
尽管官媒持续强化舆论攻势，国内未出现2012年式反日示威，反映民族主义表达方式已转向线上宣泄。中国社会当前以经济困境为优先，使“日本危险论”难以引发大规模动员。对日本而言，对华信号需保持冷静克制，避免过度反应导致双边关系缓和更加困难。
China’s retaliatory measures over Takaichi’s Taiwan remarks include a Nov. 14 advisory discouraging travel to Japan, reductions in airline capacity, and cancellation of Japan-related entertainment events such as Ayumi Hamasaki’s and Maki Otsuki’s Shanghai performances on Nov. 28. The impact, however, is regionally uneven: Kansai—highly dependent on Chinese tourists—faces the steepest losses, with Kansai International Airport expecting China-related flights to fall about 30% in December. By contrast, Tokyo’s Haneda Airport saw only minor cuts because surrendering slots risks long-term loss for China’s state airlines. Northeastern Japan remains largely unaffected; its foreign arrivals are dominated by Taiwanese visitors, supported by at least two daily direct flights to Sendai, where hotel occupancy stays high due to multi-night stays.
Post-2011 disaster ties between Taiwan and Tohoku underpin resilient tourism flows, while visitors from Southeast Asia, the US and Europe continue to travel to regional sites such as Ginzan Onsen and Matsushima Bay. Meanwhile, China is signaling economic pragmatism toward Japan: Ambassador Wu Jianghao met with Keidanren’s chair and pro-Japan lawmakers, and Beijing has avoided suspending Japan’s 30-day visa-free entry, recognizing that doing so would disrupt business and supply chains. With China’s economy struggling, the leadership remains wary of punitive actions that could damage domestic airlines, investment inflows, or corporate confidence.
Despite an intense propaganda campaign, China has seen none of the mass anti-Japan protests or boycotts that erupted in 2012, reflecting a shift in nationalism toward online expression amid economic hardship and youth unemployment. For Japan, maintaining a restrained response to Beijing’s mixed signals is essential; overreaction could complicate prospects for eventual stabilization of bilateral ties.