这份在12月4日/5日深夜突然上线的32页《国家安全战略》显示美国外交可能发生重大转向，让尤其是欧洲盟友高度不安。它突出了决策过程日益不可预测的一面，连特朗普总统本人似乎都不熟悉其内容，使任何单一表态或承诺都难以被视为可靠指引。

在欧洲问题上，该战略将“群体移民”列为西方面临的最大威胁，却完全不提俄罗斯，并公开把华盛顿与右翼民粹边境政党绑定在一起。再加上利用被冻结的俄罗斯资产重启欧洲—乌克兰—俄罗斯经贸往来、包括恢复购买俄罗斯能源这一在2022年曾被克里姆林宫当作筹码的依赖，许多人担心这等于事实上接受俄罗斯在欧洲的势力范围。

在欧洲之外，文件重启类似20世纪干预主义的强硬西半球姿态，承诺重新部署部队以确保美国在西半球保持主导，并重申自1月20日以来的一种地区优先原则。亚洲部分则比2017年的NSS对中国更为柔和，把贸易和4月的特朗普—习近平峰会放在突出位置，同时允许英伟达向中国出售更先进芯片，虽口头重申对台湾的威慑承诺，却让在制度性掣肘与更加激进的MAGA官员上升之间摇摆的盟友只能为可能的政策急转弯做最坏打算。

The new 32-page national security strategy, abruptly posted online around December 4th/5th, signals a potential shift in U.S. foreign policy that deeply worries allies, especially in Europe. It highlights growing unpredictability in decision-making, as even President Trump appears unfamiliar with the document, making any single statement or pledge an unreliable guide.

In Europe, the strategy brands "mass migration" as the West's greatest threat while omitting Russia entirely, and it aligns Washington with populist-right border parties. Combined with plans to use frozen Russian assets to restart Europe–Ukraine–Russia business ties, including renewed purchases of Russian energy that Moscow exploited in 2022, this raises fears of de facto acceptance of a Russian sphere of influence.

Beyond Europe, the document revives a hard-edged hemispheric posture reminiscent of 20th-century interventions, promising troop redeployments to keep America dominant in the western hemisphere and reaffirming a doctrine of regional pre-eminence dating back to January 20th. In Asia it is softer on China than the 2017 NSS, prioritising trade and an April Trump–Xi summit while allowing Nvidia to sell advanced chips, even as it reiterates deterrence over Taiwan and allies brace for more radical MAGA officials amid institutional resistance and a president prone to rapid policy reversals.

Source: More reasons for America’s friends to plan for the worst

Subtitle: A strategy that scorns Europe, bullies Latin America and is vague on Asia

Dateline: 12月 11, 2025 07:16 上午