主权资本的配置逻辑正发生历史性巨变。1997年亚洲金融危机后，韩国等经济体全力囤积外汇储备以捍卫本币汇率，至2016年其央行储备达4000亿美元，占对外资产的80%。然而过去十年间，官方储备规模趋于平稳，主权养老基金与主权财富基金却异军突起成为对外投资主力。韩国国民年金公团（NPS）海外资产从2012年的800亿美元飙升至约6500亿美元，一举超越央行。2014年至2025年间，中国、日本、沙特与韩国的养老及主权基金持有的海外资产至少激增3.5万亿美元，而同期全球央行总储备增幅不及该数值的一半（全球央行储备在2001年至2014年间已从2万亿美元膨胀至11.6万亿美元）。

学术研究证实了这一从防御性现金向高风险证券转移的趋势。经济学家对1950至2022年间109家央行的分析表明，储备中证券资产平均占比从2000年左右的三分之一跃升至近三分之二。除传统央行外，非央行主权机构更大胆涉足高风险信贷与股票市场：智库外交关系协会（CFR）布拉德·塞策（Brad Setser）指出，中国七大国有银行海外资产规模达3.5万亿美元，已与中国央行外汇储备相当；日本政府养老金投资基金（GPIF）海外持仓从2014年的4亿美元跃升至2026年的1万亿美元，追平本国外汇储备规模；沙特公共投资基金（PIF）海外资产亦接近其央行储备规模。

这种结构性变迁深刻重塑了美国资本市场。尽管美元在全球官方外汇储备中的份额已从2001年71%的峰值下滑至57%，但若计入主权基金和国有银行，美元霸权依然稳固——沙特PIF海外资产的80%及中国前五大银行海外持仓的70%均为美元资产。关键变化在于资金流向的转移：截至7月的过去12个月内，外国对美国国债的需求减弱，但对美股及基金的购买额创下历史新高。如韩国NPS大举建仓苹果和微软，这降低了美国企业的资本成本，却推高了美国政府的借贷成本。同时，高收益也伴随着高波动性，相比具备逆周期对冲属性的美国国债，海外股票与本土产业周期高度共振，可能加剧主权资产池的系统性脆弱。

Sovereign foreign wealth management has experienced a structural transformation over the past decade. Following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, countries like South Korea hoarded defensive foreign reserves, amassing $400bn by 2016 which constituted 80% of total foreign assets. However, traditional reserves have since plateaued, with state pension funds and sovereign wealth funds emerging as the dominant overseas investors. South Korea's National Pension Service (NPS) expanded its foreign holdings from $80bn in 2012 to roughly $650bn, surpassing the central bank. Between 2014 and 2025, foreign assets held by sovereign and pension funds across China, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea increased by at least $3.5trn. By comparison, total global central-bank reserves grew by less than half that amount, having previously ballooned from $2trn in 2001 to $11.6trn in 2014.

This evolution reflects a systemic appetite for higher yields beyond traditional cash-like instruments. Research assessing 109 central banks from 1950 to 2022 shows the share of reserves allocated to securities surged from one-third around 2000 to nearly two-thirds by 2022. Non-central-bank sovereign entities venture significantly further along the risk curve: analysis by Brad Setser reveals that seven major Chinese state-owned banks now control $3.5trn in foreign assets, matching the People's Bank of China's official reserves. Similarly, Japan's Government Pension Investment Fund increased foreign holdings from $400m in 2014 to $1trn in 2026, equaling Japan's national reserves, while Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund holds overseas portfolios roughly equivalent to its central bank's foreign assets.

This shift fundamentally reconfigures global capital flows into the United States. Although the US dollar’s share of global official foreign-exchange reserves declined from a peak of 71% in 2001 to 57%, sovereign dollar exposure remains massive: 80% of Saudi PIF's foreign portfolio and 70% of assets across China's top five banks remain parked in dollar instruments. Rather than financing public borrowing via Treasuries, yield-seeking sovereign giants are deploying record capital into high-margin American corporate equities and tech champions such as Apple and Microsoft. While this dynamic subsidizes the cost of equity for American corporations and increases borrowing costs for Uncle Sam, it exposes foreign sovereign balance sheets to sharp equity cyclicality, exacerbating correlations with domestic tech-driven export economies.

Source: Governments want to hold America’s shares more than its debts

Subtitle: When countries switch towards riskier assets, the global economy feels the consequences

Dateline: Oct 1st 2026\n