随着美国逐渐退出其协助创建的国际机构，全球多边援助领域正面临“金德尔伯格陷阱”——即原有超级大国放弃稳定全球的角色，而新兴大国尚未准备好或不愿接手。去年，美国通过世界银行和联合国等多边组织提供的援助减少了一半，不仅退出了世界卫生组织（WHO），还拖欠该组织款项。尽管中国趁势增加了出资，但华盛顿智库全球发展中心（Centre for Global Development）的研究员指出，中国目前既不愿也无力填补美国撤出后留下的资金缺口。
过去十年间，中国对多边开发银行、联合国机构及26个专门解决气候变化等特定问题的“垂直”基金（包括设在北京的亚洲基础设施投资银行和上海的新开发银行）的出资大幅增长，从2014年的约10亿美元增至2024年的30多亿美元。中国已成为世卫组织最大的成员国捐助方，承诺在五年内额外提供5亿美元，并支持中国卫生官员宋莉明年竞选该组织总干事。此外，中国还向为全球78个最贫穷国家提供援助和低息贷款的世界银行下属国际开发协会（IDA）承诺了更多资金；中国自身曾在1981年至1999年失去资格前从该机构获得近100亿美元软贷款。然而，由于经济增长，中国增加的多边出资大多属于强制性会费而非自愿捐款，包括对世卫组织的5亿美元承诺也主要反映了会费上调。
这并不令人意外，因为中国的人均GDP按世界标准衡量仍处于中等水平，才刚刚达到各国通常开始增加捐款的收入门槛。同时，中国的出资增长并未换来成比例的投票权或话语权提升：中国在世界银行的投票权份额仍低于6%，而按该行以往的公式计算本应超过12%。此外，中国籍员工在联合国职员中的占比微乎其微，仅为1.4%，排名第20位。尽管中国试图通过资助更多初级专业人员来改变现状——在2022至2023年度派遣了773名实习生，超过美国的532名——但中国公务员仍面临语言障碍、不熟悉的工作习惯，以及国内政治忠诚度审查和长期驻外导致国内人脉疏远等自我设限的障碍。
As the United States retreats from the international institutions it helped create, global multilateral aid faces a “Kindleberger trap,” wherein a stabilising superpower cedes its global role before an emerging power is ready or willing to assume it. Last year, American aid channelled through multilateral organisations like the World Bank and the UN fell by half, and the US withdrew from the World Health Organisation (WHO) while still owing it money. Although China has stepped up with more cash, researchers at the Centre for Global Development in Washington note that Beijing is currently neither willing nor able to fill the financial gap left by America's withdrawal.
Over the past decade, China’s contributions to development banks, UN agencies, and 26 issue-specific “vertical” funds—including Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and Shanghai-based New Development Bank—rose steeply from about $1bn in 2014 to over $3bn in 2024. China has become the largest member-state donor to the WHO, promising an extra $500m over five years and backing Chinese health official Song Li to lead the body next year. Additionally, China pledged more funds to the World Bank’s International Development Association, which provides aid and cheap loans to 78 of the world’s poorest countries, having itself received nearly $10bn in soft loans between 1981 and 1999 before losing eligibility. However, much of China’s additional multilateral giving—including the $500m WHO pledge—reflects mandatory membership due increases tied to economic growth rather than voluntary generosity.
This restraint aligns with China’s middling GDP per person, which has only just reached the income threshold where nations typically increase contributions. Furthermore, Beijing’s increased funding has not yielded a commensurate rise in institutional voice: its World Bank voting share remains below 6%, whereas historical formulas suggest it should exceed 12%. China’s share of UN staff is also a tiny 1.4%, ranking 20th globally. While Beijing is funding more junior entrants—contributing 773 interns in 2022–23 compared with America’s 532—its civil servants still struggle with language barriers, unfamiliar work habits, and self-imposed obstacles such as patriotic loyalty screenings and fears of domestic networks going stale during long foreign postings.
Source: China is channelling much more money to poor countries
Subtitle: It wants a greater say in organisations that hand it out
Dateline: Oct 15th 2026\n