由于担心9月18日举行的俄罗斯议会选举（被部分民众戏称为“特别选举程序”）会为新一轮军事动员铺平道路，近几周已有数以千计的俄罗斯男性逃离本国。2022年9月弗拉基米尔·普京在入侵乌克兰六个月后宣布部分动员时，曾有40万俄罗斯男性逃往国外；这一次，尽管官方尚未发布任何公告，出逃潮却已提前涌现：8月18日及此前几天，每天有2万人跨越俄罗斯与格鲁吉亚的陆路边境，约为平时的三倍；在另一个对俄免签国亚美尼亚，自今年春季以来旺盛的租房需求已将房租推高了30%至50%。协助民众逃避强制征兵的志愿者组织“滚开”（Idite Lesom）表示，今年秋季收到的求助数量比春季增加了一半；协助反战俄罗斯人移民的“方舟”（Kovcheg）组织也指出，自7月以来咨询量激增了八倍。

关于新一轮征兵的传言已流传数月：乌克兰官员预测俄方至少将征召10万人，法国总统埃马纽埃尔·马克龙在9月24日预计达30万人，极端民族主义组织“鲁西奇”（Rusich）更在7月30日呼吁动员50万人。尽管普京在上月大选前斥之为“信息战攻击”，但2022年的动员令从未被废除，且俄罗斯已完善了电子传票及征兵人员与边防官员联动等行政系统。今年夏天，莫斯科以东600公里的奔萨（Penza）曾因便衣征兵人员当街抓人引发抗议；为避免更多动荡，下一波征兵可能采取隐蔽方式，强迫负债者、失业者和挂科学生入伍，一名军事律师更透露梁赞（Ryazan）一座监狱正在采集所有囚犯的DNA样本以便在前线辨认尸体。同时，克里姆林宫将征兵配额下放给州长和大企业老板，导致富裕地区向贫困地区“买兵”：富裕的斯维尔德洛夫斯克州（Sverdlovsk）签约奖金高达310万卢布（合3.7万美元），几乎是乌拉尔山脉附近较贫穷的瑟克特夫卡尔（Syktyvkar）的四倍。

在军事层面，目前俄军每月20万卢布的微薄薪水（且常被上级克扣）主要吸引缺乏前景的低技能男性，而高达1500万卢布（超过俄罗斯平均年收入十倍）的阵亡抚恤金则吸引那些不想活下去、只想给家人留笔钱的人。为了招募更年轻、体能更好、受教育程度更高且渴望活下来的士兵——就像在乌克兰战场上表现得比俄军步兵更顽强能干的朝鲜士兵那样——克里姆林宫可能会提高月薪并降低阵亡抚恤金。如果俄罗斯对大批新兵进行良好训练和装备，并效仿乌军近期使用排雷无人机和袭击无人机操作员掩体等创新战术，在无人机效果较差的城市巷战中，俄军的人数优势可能会重新发挥关键作用。

Fearing that Russia’s September 18th parliamentary elections will usher in a new wave of military mobilisation, thousands of Russian men have fled the country in recent weeks. Whereas 400,000 men fled after Vladimir Putin declared a partial mobilisation in September 2022, Russians are now leaving pre-emptively: around 20,000 people crossed the Russian-Georgian land border on August 18th—triple the normal daily rate—while rental prices in visa-free Armenia have jumped by 30–50% since spring. Anti-mobilisation group Idite Lesom reports that autumn assistance requests rose by half compared with spring, and emigration group Kovcheg says enquiries have surged eight-fold since July.

Although Mr Putin dismissed mobilisation rumours before last month’s election, Ukrainian officials predict a call-up of at least 100,000 men, French President Emmanuel Macron put the figure at 300,000 on September 24th, and ultra-nationalist group Rusich called on July 30th for 500,000 recruits. Because the 2022 decree was never repealed and authorities now deploy electronic summonses and border-linked databases—and after street round-ups sparked protests in Penza, 600km east of Moscow, this summer—any new drive will likely coercively target debtors, the unemployed, failing students, and prisoners in places like Ryazan, where DNA samples are already being collected to identify corpses. Meanwhile, regional quotas have prompted wealthy regions to lure recruits from poorer ones, with Sverdlovsk offering a 3.1m-rouble ($37,000) sign-up bonus, nearly four times that in poorer Syktyvkar.

Currently, Russia’s army attracts mostly desperate, low-skilled men with a modest monthly wage of 200,000 roubles—often stolen by superiors—paired with hefty sign-up bonuses and a 15m-rouble death benefit exceeding ten times the average annual Russian income. To attract younger, fitter, and better-educated soldiers interested in surviving—matching the tenacity shown by North Korean troops fighting for Moscow—the Kremlin may raise monthly pay and cut death benefits; if well trained and combined with Ukrainian-style drone tactics, such numerical superiority could prove dangerous in urban combat.

Source: Russian men are fleeing before the army can grab them

Subtitle: Vladimir Putin looks poised for a huge wave of forced inductions

Dateline: Oct 15th 2026\n