特朗普在达沃斯公开重申要收购格陵兰，随后又迅速让步，宣布与北约秘书长就“未来框架”达成一致，并撤回针对8个北约成员国的关税威胁。尽管细节未明，这一退却暂时避免了一场与盟友的正面冲突。但仅仅提出以关税甚至武力胁迫盟友割让领土，就已严重损害美国信誉。跨大西洋关系一度降至70年来最低点，几乎重演1956年苏伊士危机级别的裂痕。
冲突在1月17日急剧升级：特朗普宣布自2月1日起对丹麦及另外7个向格陵兰派兵的欧洲国家征收10%关税，若6月1日前未“交付”格陵兰，税率将升至25%。以色列式的强硬手段引发欧洲反制讨论。欧盟一度考虑冻结去年签署、接受15%单边关税的贸易协议，并准备对约930亿欧元（1080亿美元）的美国产品加征关税。更极端的方案包括动用从未使用过的反胁迫工具，甚至限制芯片制造设备出口。金融市场的剧烈波动显示，美国股市和美元下跌后又在特朗普退让时反弹。
这场风波暴露了深层安全风险。美国承担北约最关键的军事角色，自成立75年来，欧洲盟军最高司令一直由美军将领担任；没有美国的空中力量和情报，欧洲威慑俄罗斯的成本将大幅上升。欧洲也意识到自身杠杆：美军依赖德国拉姆施泰因、希腊苏达湾等基地，美国在北极的监测同样依赖英、冰岛、挪威与格陵兰合作。尽管欧洲更依赖美国，但民意已转变，例如62%的德国人支持在冲突中援助丹麦。结果是欧洲一边寻找“下坡道”，一边加速为“没有美国的安全秩序”做幕后准备。
Donald Trump publicly reiterated his desire to acquire Greenland at Davos, then rapidly backed down, announcing a “framework” with NATO’s secretary-general and rescinding tariff threats against eight NATO members. Although details remain vague, the retreat averted an immediate clash with allies. Yet merely floating coercion—through tariffs or even force—against an ally badly damaged American credibility. Transatlantic relations briefly sank to their worst level in roughly 70 years, echoing the scale of the 1956 Suez crisis.
The confrontation escalated sharply on January 17th, when Trump announced a 10% tariff from February 1st on imports from Denmark and seven other European countries that had deployed troops to Greenland, rising to 25% if the territory was not handed over by June 1st. Europe discussed retaliation. The EU considered freezing a trade deal accepting a one-sided 15% tariff and imposing duties on about €93bn ($108bn) of American goods. More extreme options included invoking an unused anti-coercion instrument and restricting exports of chipmaking equipment. Market reactions were telling: the dollar and U.S. stocks fell during the escalation and rebounded once Trump retreated.
The episode exposed deeper security risks. America provides NATO’s critical military backbone; for 75 years the supreme allied commander in Europe has been American, and without U.S. air power and intelligence, deterring Russia would be far costlier. Europeans also recognised their leverage: U.S. power projection depends on bases such as Ramstein and Souda Bay, and Arctic surveillance relies on cooperation with Britain, Iceland, Norway and Greenland. Although Europe has more to lose materially, public opinion has shifted—62% of Germans support aiding Denmark. The result is a dual strategy: seeking off-ramps while quietly preparing for a future in which American security guarantees can no longer be fully trusted.