第一个主轴是全球权力在区域与结构上的再分配：1990 年至 2025 年间，G7（法国、德国、义大利、加拿大、日本、英国与美国）在全球 GDP 中的份额从约 50%降至 25%，而中国、印度与东南亚则由 15%上升到 55%。美国军事仍具压倒性能力，但中国在高超音速武器、双重技术、人工智慧等关键科技已赶超甚至超越美国。第二个趋势是权力由国家转向企业、非政府组织与其他非国家行为者：Walmart 营收超过瑞典 GDP；Meta 的每日用户超过 3.5 billion（原文 35 亿）；活跃国际 NGO 从约 1,000 成长到超过 45,000。第三个趋势是高连接仍在延续：美国有效关税率由 2.2% 升至约 10%，但世界贸易预计仍以过去十年相似速度成长；2025 年全球直接投资增加 14%。
第三个主轴是地缘政治形态转向「polyamorous」式多重关系网：意识形态区隔弱化，国家关系更流动且工具化，例如越南深化与美国安全合作、巴西在民主名义下与俄罗斯和中国靠拢。这种网络化可在贸易、公共卫生、气候等技术性议题上带来新合作：WTO 的刚性「大建筑」下滑，区域与小多边框架增加；无美方参与的世界卫生组织全球流行病条约与南非主导的 mRNA 技术转移机制显示替代能力。然而安全领域仍脆弱，当前冲突状态高于二次世界大战后任何时期之一；俄罗斯、台海与全球军备膨胀持续推升风险，核扩散已进入民主国家的讨论范围（例如韩国、波兰、日本）。自 2020 年以来，美国直接受害最大来源反而往往来自连结性外溢：新冠死亡 1.2 million（120 万）人、芬太尼约 350,000（35万）人死亡、线上诈骗每年高达 119 billion 美元（1190亿美元）损失。未来是更大合作机会与更高不确定性并存的悖论。
The essay argues the rules-based order is collapsing in two phases: gradual erosion, then abrupt disruption. Over two decades, crises such as the Iraq invasion, the financial collapse, and the pandemic exposed its unevenness, while Donald Trump accelerated the break by threatening allies, undermining agreements, imposing tariffs (including on Canadian steel and Korean cars), and launching unprovoked military actions in Venezuela and Iran. The text says principles once promoted by the United States—territorial integrity, self-determination, free trade, human rights—became “pleasant fictions” when national interest intervened. Yet the U.S.-anchored security-financial architecture had still been more predictable and stable than many historical substitutes. Against the “law of the jungle” narrative, it frames change as a transition toward decentralized pluralism rather than pure Hobbesian chaos.
The core shift is redistribution of power. From 1990 to 2025, G7 economies’ share of global GDP fell from roughly 50% to 25%, while China, India, and Southeast Asia rose from about 15% to 55%. U.S. military strength remains unparalleled, but China is catching up in strategic technologies such as hypersonics, biotech, and AI. A second trend is the rise of non-state actors: Walmart’s revenue now exceeds Sweden’s GDP; over 3.5 billion people use Meta platforms daily; active international NGOs have grown from about 1,000 to more than 45,000; technology in semiconductors, AI, and space is increasingly private-sector driven. A third trend is sustained connectivity: U.S. effective tariffs moved from 2.2% to around 10%, while global trade is still expected to keep pace with the previous decade; foreign direct investment rose 14% in 2025. These metrics indicate redistribution, corporatization, and networked interdependence rather than complete decoupling.
The final section calls the new pattern “polyamorous geopolitics”: ideologically fixed blocs are fading as states form issue-based, fluid coalitions (e.g., Vietnam deepening U.S. security ties; Brazil standing with Russia and China in BRICS). This flexibility can improve governance in technical domains: regional trade blocs and “minilateral” deals are replacing rigid WTO universals; regional and bilateral financial safety nets are proliferating beside the IMF; and pandemic response is increasingly distributed, including the WHO pandemic treaty without the U.S. and a South Africa-led mRNA technology-transfer effort. Climate action also continues through emitters, cities, philanthropies, carbon markets, and investors, despite anti-global rhetoric. But the security paradox persists: the number of countries in conflict is at its highest since World War II, nuclear options are resurfacing in democracies like South Korea, Poland, and Japan, and instability is amplified by U.S. unpredictability, Russia, China-Taiwan tensions, and rising military spending. Since 2020, U.S. vulnerability has also come from connected-world harms—1.2 million Covid deaths, around 350,000 fentanyl deaths, and up to $119 billion annual online scam losses—so the order is simultaneously more cooperative and more perilous.