文章描述一场跨越约100天的中共高层权力斗争如何外溢至日本选举情势：Xi Jinping（中央军委 CMC 主席）与解放军 PLA 高层将领 Zhang Youxia（CMC 第一副主席、政治局成员）在2025年10月一次关键党内会议后走向决裂并以清洗收场。冲突在中共第二十届中央委员会第四次全体会议（2025年10月20日至10月23日）期间公开化：9名曾任高阶军官（含接近 Xi 的人）被以贪腐名义正式开除党籍，象征 Xi 的「福建帮」在军中被成批拔除。表面上军内权力平衡似乎回复，但作者强调这只是清洗风暴中的短暂平静，因 Xi 同时把 Zhang 视为阻碍其对军队集中控制、以及对台政策（北京称为「内政」）的核心障碍。
时间线把中国军内清洗与日本政局精准对齐：Sanae Takaichi（自民党 LDP）于2025年10月21日就任首相，正值北京四中全会进行中；Xi 在2025年10月30日于釜山与 Donald Trump 会面，对贸易战达成暂时停火，并大致同意2026年互访（Trump 预计2026年4月访中，Xi 同年稍晚访美）。其后 Xi 于2025年10月31日在韩国庆州与 Takaichi 首度会谈，气氛紧张；Takaichi 对南海、香港、新疆与台海稳定直言关切。2025年11月7日，Takaichi 在国会称若中国攻台将对日本构成「存亡威胁」，可能触发集体自卫权；中方以「严重干涉内政」抨击。作者并提及 Wang Yi 等外交系统在 Xi 与 Zhang 对峙背景下加大对日批评以护持 Xi 颜面。
自2025年11月中旬起，北京采取对日施压组合拳：劝阻中国公民赴日、要求国内航空公司缩减对日航班等；Takaichi 反而因强硬应对而提升支持度，遂于2026年1月19日宣布将解散众议院并在2月8日举行突袭大选，1月23日正式解散；其执政联盟（LDP 与 Japan Innovation Party）仅握「些微」多数。与此同步，Zhang 于1月19日遭拘留（消息源自知情人士），中国国防部于1月24日宣布其因「涉嫌严重违纪违法」受查，标志 Xi 对 Zhang 的斗争在约3个月后（距10月四中全会）完成关键清算。结论是：即使2月8日选举结局未定，Xi 对东京的高压路线短期难逆转；在2027年中共二十一大（Xi 被预期争取第四任期）前，内外权力重整仍将延续，而若中美关系因2026年互访而维持短暂稳定，中国可能更有余裕对日加码施压。
The piece argues that a roughly 100-day, behind-the-scenes power struggle in China’s top leadership—between Xi Jinping (as Central Military Commission chairman) and Gen. Zhang Youxia (senior CMC vice chairman and a Politburo member)—is spilling into Japan’s election dynamics. The conflict is traced to a key Chinese Communist Party meeting in October 2025 and becomes visible at the fourth plenum of the 20th Central Committee (Oct. 20–23), where nine former high-ranking military officers, including aides close to Xi, are formally expelled for corruption. The purge also wipes out key members of the PLA’s “Fujian clique,” long associated with Xi and Taiwan-related planning. Although this briefly looks like a restored internal balance, the author frames it as a lull inside a continuing purge cycle, with Xi simultaneously preparing to remove Zhang as an ally-turned-obstacle to tighter personal control of the military.
A synchronized timeline links these Chinese events to Japan’s politics. Sanae Takaichi of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party takes office on Oct. 21, 2025, while the plenum is underway in Beijing. Xi then meets U.S. President Donald Trump on Oct. 30 in Busan, reaching a temporary trade-war truce and broadly agreeing on reciprocal state visits in 2026 (Trump expected to visit China in April, Xi to visit the U.S. later). On Oct. 31 in Gyeongju, Xi holds first talks with Takaichi in an unexpectedly tense atmosphere, as she raises concerns about the South China Sea, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Taiwan Strait stability. On Nov. 7, Takaichi states in Japan’s parliament that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could pose an existential threat to Japan and could justify collective self-defense, prompting Beijing to denounce “gross interference” in an “internal affair,” with officials such as Wang Yi facing incentives to defend Xi’s standing.
From mid-November 2025, Beijing escalates pressure on Japan by urging Chinese nationals to refrain from travel and pressing domestic airlines to cut flights, while Takaichi’s refusal to yield boosts her approval and emboldens a snap-election bid. She announces on Jan. 19, 2026, plans to dissolve the House of Representatives and hold an election on Feb. 8; she dissolves the chamber on Jan. 23 with her coalition (the LDP and the Japan Innovation Party) holding only a razor-thin majority. The same Jan. 19 date is cited for Zhang’s formal detention, and on Jan. 24 China’s Defense Ministry announces an investigation for “suspected serious discipline and law violations,” marking the culmination of Xi’s campaign about three months after the October plenum. The conclusion is that, regardless of Japan’s Feb. 8 result, China’s hard-pressure posture is unlikely to reverse soon, and instability will persist toward the Party’s 21st congress in 2027, where Xi is expected to seek a fourth term, with U.S.–China steadiness in 2026 potentially enabling even tougher pressure on Tokyo.