Donald Trump 的中国路线从第一任期的不可预测走向第二任期的更剧烈反复。2025 年 4 月的“liberation day”高关税引发中国反制，暴露美国对中方关键供应链投入的依赖，供应短缺风险上升，且稀土与磁体管制显示战略物资脆弱性。其后晶片出口限制松动、对台外交施压并以交易交换平衡，虽有这些动作，强硬要素仍未消失：美国2025年底批准对台湾 1110 亿美元（111 billion）创纪录军售；中国2026年则建立法律框架，针对稀土与其他双用途产品建立限制，并对日本施压，显示其经济封锁能力正在升级。
竞争又延伸到网路、人工智慧与代理战争。文章指出中国新模型可能仅落后美国几个月，且白宫称北京正在进行产业规模的技术窃取；在地缘上，中国加大由宫古海峡至塔斯曼海的军演、对台湾的灰色地带压力与对伊朗联盟，Xi Jinping 亦据报命令 PLA 为 2027 年前台海情境做预备并囤积燃料与粮食。虽然日本南西群岛防卫、与伙伴演习及关键矿产合作同步扩张，盟友仍忧心美军资源因波斯湾战事抽离西太平洋；即使未达 Donald Trump 申请的美国 1.5 万亿美元（$1.5 trillion）防务预算，竞争压力累积的速度仍快于地缘信任修复。
The anticipated Xi Jinping–Donald Trump Beijing two-day summit can be read as another de-escalation attempt after the 2022 Bali G20, focused on trade, tariffs, Taiwan, AI, semiconductors, and soybeans, while observers parse each phrase. The argument is that U.S.–China rivalry is hardening at a structural level despite symbolic communiqués and photos; Xi appears to be accumulating leverage for the next escalation, while Donald Trump’s strategic intent is still unclear, and temporary calm may simply be a pause.
Donald Trump’s China policy moved from first-term volatility to second-term swings. After the 2025 April “liberation day” tariff surge, China’s retaliation and U.S. dependence on Chinese inputs produced a retreat, and supply shortages became a risk; rare-earth and magnet controls then exposed vulnerability in strategic materials. Export-control pressure later thawed, Taiwan’s Lai Ching-te was pressured, and Washington blended hawkish rhetoric with transactional bargaining. Yet coercive leverage persisted: in late 2025, a record $111 billion arms sale to Taiwan was approved, and in 2026 China built legal tools to restrict rare-earths and dual-use goods, including sanctions pressure on Japan, signalling a stronger coercive toolkit.
Competition is now also intensifying in cybersecurity, AI, and proxy fronts. China’s new models are portrayed as only months behind the U.S., while the White House says Beijing is running industrial-scale technical theft. Geopolitically, China has expanded drills from the Miyako Strait to the Tasman Sea, increased gray-zone pressure on Taiwan, and deepened ties with Iran. Xi Jinping reportedly ordered PLA Taiwan-preparedness by 2027 and built stockpiles of fuel and food. Allies face uncertainty as U.S. assets shift to the Gulf even while Japan’s island defenses, allied exercises, and critical-mineral cooperation expand. A larger U.S. defense budget than current levels, still below Donald Trump’s requested $1.5 trillion, may still fall behind the speed at which competitive pressure is being added.