由英国、法国和德国组成的E3正重新成为欧洲的核心领导层，在乌克兰、俄罗斯和与愈发疏远的美国的关系上进行协调，其动力来自泽连斯基为应对美国28点和平计划而展开的外交，以及2024年5月梅尔茨上台后不久三人一起乘坐11小时火车前往基辅的行动。这个三方合作是对过去“梅克龙”（默克尔与萨科齐）的升级版，被视为欧洲在安全问题上“亲自掌舵”的新尝试。

自2003年三国外长共同前往德黑兰谈判伊朗铀浓缩问题以来，这一三边机制一直存在，但现在已达到自英国2016年脱欧公投以来最紧密的程度：三国国家安全顾问每周通话数次，2024年更新与重签的多项双边条约编织出所谓“多边—双边网”，并支持由英法牵头、在巴黎附近设立司令部的乌克兰停火后“自愿者联盟”安抚部队，而德国只参与政治协调、不派地面部队。

三位领导人都在国内极不得人心，执政基础薄弱，并受到右翼民粹势力威胁；在巴勒斯坦承认问题、采购美制还是欧制武器以及以贸易为核心的对华政策上，他们也存在明显分歧，加之意大利和波兰等被排除在外国家的怨气，使E3前景受限。即便如此，如果运用得当，这一机制仍可能在捍卫乌克兰利益、推进欧洲战略自主、并在一定程度上约束特朗普方面发挥重要作用。

The E3—Britain, France and Germany—has re‑emerged as Europe’s core leadership group, coordinating on Ukraine, Russia and relations with a more distant America, sparked by Zelensky’s response to a 28‑point U.S. peace plan and cemented by an 11‑hour train trip to Kyiv shortly after Merz took office in May 2024. This trilateral cooperation updates the earlier “Merkozy” era and is seen as a new attempt to put Europe in charge of its own security.

Since 2003, when the three foreign ministers jointly went to Tehran to address Iran’s uranium‑enrichment programme, the format has persisted, but it is now at its strongest since Britain’s 2016 Brexit vote: the three national‑security advisers speak several times a week, and a web of bilateral treaties renewed or signed in 2024 creates “multibilateralism”. They back a “coalition of the willing” reassurance force for Ukraine, co‑led by Britain and France with a headquarters near Paris, where Germany co‑chairs meetings but refuses to send ground troops.

All three leaders are domestically weak and unpopular, threatened by the populist right, and their E3 project is constrained by splits over recognition of Palestine, preferences for American versus European arms, and an EU‑centred China trade policy that excludes Britain, as well as resentment from left‑out states such as Italy and Poland. Even so, if managed deftly, the E3 could still defend Ukraine’s interests, strengthen European strategic autonomy and help curb Donald Trump’s more disruptive instincts.