中国在习近平的全球安全倡议下扩大了海外安全参与，将论坛改造为“全球公安合作论坛”（来自超过120个国家的代表参加）并推出“全球公共安全指数”，中国位列首位，美国显著低于平均水平。监控技术出口激增：海康威视与大华合计占有40%市场份额；华为的“安全城市”系统部署于超过100个国家；Geedge向埃塞俄比亚、哈萨克斯坦、缅甸和巴基斯坦出售互联网控制技术。

培训方面：自2000年以来，向138个国家的警察与国内安全部队提供了近900次培训。年度培训从2010年的14次增长到2019年的138次（约10倍），在新冠期间下降，尚未完全反弹。大多数培训在中国警校进行；区域重点为中亚、东南亚和非洲。涉政体覆盖：82%的威权政体接受过培训；约33%的完全民主国家（多为表面性培训）；75%的有缺陷民主；86%的混合政体也接受过培训。

影响上：中国提供的技术与培训以“无附加条件”吸引各国，等于是赋能监控与政权安全。例证包括：尽管发生导致16人死亡的中国建造站棚坍塌并引发抗议，81%的塞尔维亚游民对中国仍持好感；哈萨克斯坦在2022年骚乱后安装了数千台摄像头；埃塞俄比亚在接受中国培训与监控后仍面临叛乱和动荡。研究显示，华为设备进口会在专制国家增加数字压制，但对民主国家无显著影响；脆弱国家更可能因此加剧镇压。

China has expanded security engagement under Xi’s Global Security Initiative, repurposing forums into the Global Public Security Co-operation Forum (delegates from >120 countries) and launching a Global Public Security Index that ranks China top and the US below average. Surveillance exports: Hikvision+Dahua hold 40% market share; Huawei’s Safe City is in >100 countries; Geedge sold internet-control tech to Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Myanmar and Pakistan.

Training: nearly 900 sessions for police and domestic-security forces in 138 countries since 2000. Annual sessions rose from 14 in 2010 to 138 in 2019 (~10×), fell during COVID and have not fully rebounded. Most training occurs at Chinese police colleges; regional focus is Central and South-East Asia and Africa. Regime reach: 82% of authoritarian regimes received training; ~33% of full democracies (mainly superficial); 75% of flawed democracies; 86% of hybrid regimes.

Impact: China’s technical and training aid creates "no-strings" appeal that empowers surveillance and regime security. Examples: 81% of Serbians view China favourably despite protests and a Chinese-built canopy collapse that killed 16; Kazakhstan installed thousands of cameras after 2022 unrest; Ethiopia received training and Chinese surveillance but faces insurgencies and instability. Studies find Huawei imports increase digital repression in autocracies but not in democracies; vulnerable states risk intensifying repression.