欧洲对特朗普在达沃斯的态度感到意外：他语气较为缓和，放弃立即加征关税，排除使用武力，并提出与丹麦就格陵兰建立“框架”与可能达成协议。这一转向暂时缓解了可能冲击跨大西洋联盟的危机。但核心风险仍在。特朗普长期觊觎格陵兰，其对北约的轻蔑言辞暴露出更深层的不信任。格陵兰本身对美国的直接战略增益有限，现有条约已允许美国实现多数安全目标，且当地已有美军基地；额外的主权收益几乎为零。
欧洲此轮得以过关，关键在于让特朗普看到明确代价。关税威胁引发欧洲反制预期，市场担忧贸易战与安全危机对美国的损害；美国国内舆论反对高成本接管，国会亦罕见施压。数字层面上，特朗普宣称美国为北约支付“100%”却无回报，财政部长称自1980年以来美国在防务上比欧洲多支出22万亿美元；而事实是，欧洲正因俄罗斯威胁而提高军费，且北约唯一一次第五条被触发是9·11后援助美国，丹麦在阿富汗的人均伤亡高于美国。
结构性风险在于特朗普将盟友视为负担。美国提供北约约40%的能力，也是最关键的40%；欧洲却是美国价值约1万亿美元的商品与服务市场，并提供芯片制造、通信、航空等关键技术与情报。若盟友失去对美国的信任，德国、日本、波兰、韩国可能加速重整军备甚至考虑核扩散，削弱美国威慑并增加大国战争概率。欧洲需同时维护北约残余、加速自身硬实力建设，并向美国国内清晰展示裂痕的真实成本。
Europeans were surprised by Donald Trump’s tone in Davos: he sounded conciliatory, dropped immediate tariffs, ruled out force, and floated a “framework” and possible deal with Denmark over Greenland. The shift eased a crisis that threatened the transatlantic alliance, but the risk remains. Trump has coveted Greenland for years, and his scornful language about NATO signals deeper distrust. Greenland offers limited marginal strategic gain for the United States; existing treaties already permit most objectives and a U.S. base is in place. The additional benefit of sovereignty is negligible.
Europe got through this round by imposing credible costs. Tariff threats prompted European retaliation signals; markets priced the damage from a trade war and security shock; U.S. public opinion opposed a costly takeover; and Congress pushed back. Numerically, Trump claims America pays “100%” for NATO and gets nothing, while the treasury secretary cites $22trn in extra U.S. defence spending since 1980. In reality, Europe is raising defence outlays due to Russia, NATO’s Article 5 was invoked only after 9/11 to support America, and Denmark suffered higher per-capita losses than the U.S. in Afghanistan.
The structural danger is Trump’s view of allies as liabilities. America supplies about 40% of NATO’s capacity—the most critical share—yet Europe is a roughly $1trn market for U.S. goods and services and provides essential technologies and intelligence. If trust collapses, Germany, Japan, Poland, and South Korea could rearm faster and even consider nuclear options, weakening U.S. deterrence and raising great-power war risks. Europe must preserve what remains of NATO, build hard power quickly, and make clear to U.S. investors, voters, and lawmakers the concrete costs of rupture.