战争正在扩张：乌普萨拉冲突数据项目在2025年记录了65场活跃的国家参与冲突，为1946年有记录以来最高，其中包括8场国家对国家战争，2场年度战斗死亡超过1,000人。奥斯陆和平研究所也发现，尽管2022年至2023年战斗相关死亡急剧下降，过去四年仍是冷战结束以来最暴力的时期。

在乌克兰，传感器、精确火力和网络把战场变得更透明，把无人机支撑的消耗带从约5公里扩大到常常接近30公里；软件代码每几天更新，六周通常需要较大软件升级，六个月可能需要硬件更换。双方每天生产数千架FPV无人机，俄罗斯伤亡估计达110万至140万，相当于50岁以下男性每25人中1人，乌克兰损失较低但仍相当于战前18至49岁人口每16人中1人，且乌军仅2026年前三个月就使用无人地面车辆执行超过24,000次任务。

技术优势仍不等于战略胜利：美国“史诗愤怒”行动打击了13,000个目标，以色列又增加数千个，但伊朗仍保有战前75%的导弹发射器和70%的巡航及弹道导弹，而摧毁30%已比1991年1,500多架次搜寻“飞毛腿”却无确证摧毁更有效。精确打击链仍有瓶颈，英国瞄准使用20套系统上的270多个应用，传感器到射手时间下降33%，美国目标量从每天400个追求到1,500个甚至Maven声称的5,000个；与此同时，2022年美国情报曾估计若克里米亚受威胁，俄罗斯使用核武的概率为50-50，显示透明化战争仍伴随巨大升级风险。

War is expanding: the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme recorded 65 active state-based conflicts in 2025, the highest since records began in 1946, including eight state-on-state wars and two with annual battle deaths above 1,000. The Peace Research Institute Oslo similarly finds that, despite a sharp fall in battle-related deaths from 2022 to 2023, the past four years have been the most violent period since the end of the cold war.

In Ukraine, sensors, precision firepower and networks have made the battlefield more transparent, widening the drone-enabled attrition belt from about 5km to often nearly 30km; software code is updated every few days, larger software upgrades are typically needed in six weeks, and hardware changes may be needed in six months. Both sides produce thousands of FPV drones daily, Russian casualties are estimated at 1.1m-1.4m, or one in 25 men under 50, Ukraine’s losses are lower but still equal one in 16 of its pre-war 18- to 49-year-olds, and Ukrainian forces used uncrewed ground vehicles for more than 24,000 missions in just the first three months of 2026.

Technological advantage still does not equal strategic victory: America’s Operation Epic Fury hit 13,000 targets, with Israel adding thousands more, yet Iran retains 75% of its pre-war missile launchers and 70% of its cruise and ballistic missiles, while destroying 30% is already more effective than the 1,500-plus sorties against Scuds in 1991 that produced no confirmed launcher kills. Precision kill chains still have bottlenecks, with Britain using more than 270 targeting applications on 20 systems, sensor-to-shooter time down 33%, and American target production ambitions rising from 400 a day to 1,500 or even Maven’s claimed 5,000; meanwhile, in 2022 US intelligence judged a 50-50 chance that Russia would use nuclear weapons if Crimea were threatened, showing that transparent warfare still carries huge escalation risks.

Source: The dangerous delusion of modern warfare

Subtitle: Our defence editor assesses how conflict has changed in recent years

Dateline: 5月 28, 2026 03:25 上午