中国对日本的强硬策略在选举周期中产生反噬效应。随着日本下议院选举临近，中国因首相高市早苗涉台言论而采取的舆论与经济施压，反而推动日本国内形成跨党派的对华强硬共识。1月16日成立的中间派改革联盟（CRA）由最大在野党立宪民主党与第三大党公明党联合组建，旨在制衡执政联盟。尽管其出现本应利好北京分化日本政治，但其基本政策明确提出“对中国关切作出坚定回应”，令中方陷入被动。中国官媒对该联盟的成立与政策几乎保持沉默。

选举算术与时间节点放大了影响。高市宣布解散众议院并于2月8日举行提前选举；当前执政的自民党—维新会联盟仅在众议院拥有微弱多数，且在参议院并未过半。中国的施压被认为抬升了高市内阁支持率，并促使其提前选举以巩固权力。与此同时，CRA在五大政策支柱中强调“现实的外交与防务政策”和宪法讨论，承认在“生存威胁事态”下行使集体自卫权的合宪性，明显靠拢2015年安保法制立场。

经济与安全杠杆的数量化风险强化了日本共识。中国通过收紧军民两用物项出口、影响对日稀土供应施压，而稀土对智能手机与电动车等高科技产业至关重要。2012年尖阁诸岛国有化后的反日示威与经济冲击仍具记忆效应，促使在野阵营避免被视为“对华软弱”。结果是，无论执政还是在野，竞选策略在投票前两周半趋同：在对华问题上保持强硬，显示中国“统一战线”策略在日本政治中的失效。

China’s hardline strategy toward Japan is backfiring as the election cycle amplifies domestic effects. Beijing’s retaliation over Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s Taiwan remarks—through media attacks and economic pressure—has helped forge a cross-party consensus in Japan to stand firm. The Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), formed on January 16 by the Constitutional Democratic Party and Komeito to counterbalance the ruling coalition, unexpectedly adopted a policy pledging a “firm response to concerns over China.” Rather than benefiting from opposition fragmentation, China now faces an opposition whose platform mirrors toughness it sought to undermine, prompting state media to largely ignore the CRA.

Electoral math and timing magnify the repercussions. Takaichi announced a snap lower-house election for February 8; the ruling LDP–Ishin alliance holds only a razor-thin majority in the lower house and lacks one in the upper house. China’s pressure appears to have bolstered cabinet approval and emboldened Takaichi to seek a stronger mandate. The CRA’s five policy pillars include “realistic foreign and defense policies” and constitutional debate, endorsing the legality of collective self-defense in “survival-threatening situations,” aligning closely with the 2015 security legislation it once opposed.

Quantifiable economic and security levers harden Japan’s stance. China’s tightening of export controls on dual-use items—effectively constraining rare-earth supplies vital to smartphones and electric vehicles—raises tangible risks. Memories of the 2012 Senkaku nationalization backlash, including anti-Japanese protests and economic damage, further deter any appearance of concession. With two and a half weeks to go, both ruling and opposition camps converge on a vote-winning strategy: stand tough against China, underscoring the failure of Beijing’s united-front approach in Japanese politics.