在过去十年里，中国一直向外界强调其贸易稳定与开放，特朗普提高关税和伊朗袭击后全球秩序的混乱使其“稳定与确定性”叙事更具吸引力。部分观点把战争描绘成通过打击能源与盟友来围困中国的“联合打击”，但这种说法被夸大了，中国更可能是受损的一方，而非明确受益者。
这场冲突通过能源、出口和地缘风险推高成本，但中国相比部分邻国更具缓冲：约三分之一的中国原油通过霍尔木兹海峡进口，韩国和日本则超过70%，且煤炭、核能和快速增长的可再生能源降低了对油气依赖。中国还拥有煤基化工替代能力和约四个月海运进口储备，3月23日成品油上调13%后仍应对：生产者物价指数连续41个月同比下跌，GDP平减指数连续11个季度下滑，说明当前增压主要是成本推动而非需求驱动。
在出口方面，全球因油价上升而收紧消费可能压制中国工厂，但也可能提高中国“新能源三件套”需求：电动车、锂离子电池和太阳能电池板，中国在这三类产业至少占全球70%产能；去年贸易顺差创下1.2万亿美元高位，约占当年经济增长的三分之一。若航运成本上升且伙伴国信心受损，面对2026年4.5%–5%的增长目标（自1991年以来最低）北京可能不得不更快降息并扩大财政支出、甚至更积极托底地产；Macquarie观点是，外部冲击决定刺激力度，外需转弱则加码，外需转强则减码。
China has spent almost a decade presenting itself as a force for stability and openness, and after Trump's tariffs and the Iran strike, that message has become more persuasive amid greater global disorder. Claims that the war was a coordinated effort to punish China by hitting its energy and allies are overstated; China is more likely to be hurt than to emerge as a clear winner.
The conflict raises costs through energy, exports, and geopolitical risk, yet China is relatively better shielded than some peers: about one-third of its crude passes through the Strait of Hormuz versus over 70% for South Korea and Japan, and coal, nuclear, and rapidly growing renewables reduce oil-and-gas dependence. China also has buffers, including coal-to-chemicals capacity and roughly four months of seaborne-oil import reserves; after a 13% petrol increase on March 23, producer prices have still fallen for 41 straight months and the GDP deflator for 11 consecutive quarters, so inflation pressure is largely cost-led rather than demand-led.
On the export side, higher energy prices could curb global spending and weigh on Chinese factories, but they could also lift demand for China’s “new three” exports—electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries, and solar cells—where China already accounts for at least 70% of global capacity, after a 2025 record $1.2 trillion trade surplus, roughly one-third of growth. If shipping costs rise and partner confidence weakens, Beijing may need faster rate cuts and more fiscal spending, potentially stronger property support, while pursuing a 2026 growth target of 4.5%–5% (its weakest since 1991); Macquarie’s view is that global disruptions determine policy intensity, with weak exports requiring more stimulus and strong exports requiring less.
Source: Why the Iran war hurts China less than its rivals
Subtitle: But more than it admits
Dateline: 4月 01, 2026 09:01 下午 | Beijing