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第一月战争较克制,第二月走向升级:4月2日美国袭击了伊朗最高桥(B1),与此同时伊朗无人机报复性袭击了科威特油炼厂,美国随后又先后威胁毁坏更多桥梁和发电厂;4月7日双方达成两周停火,但这并未削弱德黑兰政权,反而是在制裁和高油价背景下,伊斯兰革命卫队(IRGC)这种商业帝国体系的收益面被战争进一步强化。战争结束前后并未出现“降温”导致政权财政动摇的迹象,反而是其掌控的战争型经济链条更稳。

普通伊朗民众则继续承压:近六成劳动年龄人口据称失业,1月已有示威,战争月内又遭受1.1万次美国打击,互联网封锁压缩服务业(该行业曾吸纳半数劳动力),政府称有700万人、即四分之一劳动者志愿服役。黑市汇率自开战以来再贬值8%,此前通胀接近50%,开战后又再涨约6%,而乌兹群经(UAE)贡献了2025年约三分之一伊朗进口但已停止一艘船舶往来,关闭边界并抓捕大量空壳公司相关人员,导致进口供应几乎断流。

对伊朗总体经济看是挤压,对IRGC却是高利润局面:其控制的油、制造与走私收入三大渠道都在扩张,2025年其处理约半数油出口,价值至少300亿美元;若其占比与去年相同,年内有望拿到近150亿美元。国内企业方面IRGC五大司令部据称持有约半数企业,化妆品和加工食品利润在一个月内已有翻倍预期,走私和港口机场边境网络在航运中断与油运通道定价上升中也获益——每艘经霍尔木兹支付200万美元、流量恢复至战前一半130艘/日时,理论上可带来约500亿美元关税收入。

As Iran’s civilian economy crumbles, its military economy grows stronger image
As Iran’s civilian economy crumbles, its military economy grows stronger image
As Iran’s civilian economy crumbles, its military economy grows stronger image

The first month of the campaign was relatively restrained, but in the second month the scale shifted: on April 2 the B1 bridge was damaged as families picnicked nearby, Iran struck a Kuwaiti refinery in response, and U.S. officials then threatened to destroy more bridges and power plants before a two-week ceasefire was agreed on April 7; that pause has not weakened Tehran, because sanctions and wartime oil conditions have strengthened the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)’s commercial system.

For ordinary Iranians, conditions worsened sharply: six in ten working-age people are estimated to be unemployed, 11,000 U.S. strikes disrupted daily life, internet shutdowns squeezed services that once employed half the workforce, and the government says 7 million people, or one in four workers, have volunteered for military service; the black-market rial has fallen another 8% since the war began, inflation has risen from just under 50% to roughly 56% overall, and the UAE, previously supplying nearly one-third of Iran’s 2025 imports, sent no ships, tightened borders, and moved against shell-company networks that had helped sanctions evasion.

IRGC finances are insulated and even expanding across oil, domestic manufacturing, and illicit trade: it handled roughly half of Iran’s oil exports in 2025, at least $30 billion, and has likely preserved export volume while nearly doubling earnings, meaning roughly half of the incremental revenue flows toward the Guards; its five branches own conglomerates tied to many firms, including food and consumer goods, with month-on-month profits in some sectors expected to double. Though war has disrupted some facilities, the broader model remains resilient through port and border control, smuggling premiums, and $2 million per-ship toll assumptions at Hormuz that could yield about $50 billion if traffic returned to half of pre-war 130 vessels per day, while payments rerouted through China and linked systems like Shetab–Mir help insulate core revenue.

Source: As Iran’s civilian economy crumbles, its military economy grows stronger

Subtitle: War has split the country in two

Dateline: 4月 09, 2026 03:38 上午


2026-04-11 (Saturday) · b1c8698855e6913b2265c5450515647403e1c78a

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