中国人民解放军（People's Liberation Army, PLA）高层近年频繁「消失」与清洗的趋势，最新焦点是对张又侠（Zhang Youxia）与刘振立（Liu Zhenli）的调查。中国国防部（Ministry of Defense）于一个星期六宣布两人因「涉嫌严重违纪违法」受查，并称由中共中央（Central Committee of the Communist Party）作出决定，未提供细节。结果使中央军委（Central Military Commission, CMC）仅剩2名成员：主席Xi Jinping与副主席张升民（Zhang Shengmin）；而在2022年10月二十大后，中央军委原有7人，前国防部长Li Shangfu、前军委副主席He Weidong与Miao Hua已先后被清洗。文中强调，现仅存的著军装成员张升民主要履历在纪检与政治工作，并非军事指挥专长，意味实务指挥链短期内运作将更不稳。
文章以数字与时间轴刻画Xi Jinping与张又侠关系的变化。张又侠现年75岁，属政治局（Politburo）成员与两名军委副主席中资深者；他与Xi Jinping同为「二代红」，且年长3岁，父亲张宗逊（Zhang Zongxun）为「开国上将」，张又侠并曾参与1979年中越战争。文中回溯到2012年11月前后：Xi Jinping曾「消失」约2周并在医院进行幕后政治运作，分别会见太子党与二代红以铺垫反腐，张又侠成为其在军中关键盟友。更关键的是，张又侠被描绘为Xi Jinping与退休党内元老之间的重要「管道」与「平衡器」，能提供建设性批评，因此在2022年10月二十大时虽已72岁仍未退休，被解读为Xi派系胜出后与元老势力之间的妥协安排。
文章将裂痕的显性化定位在2023年夏秋之际：Li Shangfu在被张又侠推荐、就任仅数月后即被撤，且火箭军（Rocket Force）高层（含司令李玉超Li Yuchao）亦出现突兀更换；火箭军于2015年成立，掌管核与导弹力量。此后事件与外媒报导交织：一个星期日《Wall Street Journal》称张又侠被指控向美方泄露核武计划资讯；同时，2024年11月起，与Xi Jinping关系最密切的「福建帮」军中要员遭连串清洗，军内并流传16字口号，强调集体领导与会议决策；《PLA Daily》也刊发呼应「四项基本原则」的评论。文中称Xi Jinping隐忍等待，并在火箭军丑闻调查进入第3年后突然出手；《PLA Daily》指两人「严重背叛信任」并破坏「军委主席负责制」。最后以1971年林彪（Lin Biao）事件作历史对照，并指出失去这条元老管道后，党军内部更不稳，且通往2027年二十一大、Xi Jinping被预期寻求第4任党魁之权力斗争已启动。
The article describes a trend of repeated, opaque disappearances and purges among senior People’s Liberation Army (PLA) figures, with the latest shock centered on Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. China’s Ministry of Defense announced on a Saturday that both were under investigation for “suspected serious discipline and law violations,” saying the decision was made by the Communist Party’s Central Committee without details. The move leaves the Central Military Commission (CMC) with only 2 members—Chairman Xi Jinping and Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin—down from 7 immediately after the October 2022 Party congress; former Defense Minister Li Shangfu, former vice CMC chairman He Weidong, and Miao Hua had already been purged. With Zhang Shengmin the only remaining uniformed officer and primarily a discipline-and-political-work specialist, the piece argues the practical command chain is likely to function poorly in the near term.
A numeric, date-driven narrative frames how Xi Jinping’s relationship with Zhang Youxia deteriorated. Zhang, 75, is portrayed as a senior Politburo member and the more senior of the CMC’s two vice chairmen, long seen as one of Xi’s most trusted military allies. Both are “second-generation reds,” and Zhang is 3 years older; his father Zhang Zongxun was a “founding general,” and Zhang had combat experience including commanding troops in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. The article links this to Xi’s two-week disappearance around November 2012, described as a hospital cover for behind-the-scenes bargaining to secure princeling support for an anti-corruption drive. Crucially, Zhang is depicted as a conduit and political balancer between Xi and retired party elders, which helps explain why he did not retire at the October 2022 congress despite being 72—an outcome framed as a compromise after Xi’s factional victory.
The rupture becomes explicit in summer–autumn 2023, when Li Shangfu—appointed on Zhang’s recommendation—was removed only months later, alongside unusual leadership replacements in the PLA Rocket Force (including commander Li Yuchao). The Rocket Force, established in 2015, oversees China’s nuclear and missile arsenal. The article then ties internal upheaval to external allegations: a Wall Street Journal report on a Sunday said Zhang was accused of leaking information on China’s nuclear-weapons program to the U.S. It also highlights that from November 2024, members of Xi’s close military “Fujian clique” were purged, while a 16-character slogan stressing collective leadership and meeting-based decisions circulated and PLA Daily revived commentary aligned with the Party’s “four basic principles.” The piece says Xi waited, then acted as the Rocket Force-centered probe entered its third year, with PLA Daily accusing Zhang and Liu of betrayal and of undermining the “CMC chairman responsibility system.” It closes by invoking Lin Biao’s 1971 downfall as a historical parallel and argues that losing this elders’ conduit increases instability as the power struggle ahead of the 2027 Party congress—where Xi is expected to seek a fourth term as party chief—intensifies.