中国共产党拥有逾1亿名党员，但只有23名（约占0.00002%）的政治局成员制定政策，他们在2024年稳定楼市的努力失败，尽管有如上海一套每平方米逾100万元（14万美元）的破纪录豪宅成交，70个大城市房价仍恢复下跌，并创下一年来最大单月跌幅。出口的意外韧性使约5%的增长目标仍可企及，但房地产再度成为拖累整体经济的重要来源。

房价自2021年峰值已下跌20–40%，截至4月，瑞银调查的2,500户家庭中近一半出现账面亏损，预计今年年底将有约70万套住房陷入“负资产”，明年增至180万套。负资产并不必然导致违约——1997年后在香港，即便超过30%的借款人房贷“倒挂”，严重拖欠者也仅约1.4%——但在内地，抵押品价值下滑正同时压缩居民与银行的安全边际。

约25万亿元人民币的小微企业贷款以住房作抵押，瑞银预计到2026年被法拍的房产可达150万套，大量抛售将进一步加剧下行压力，因此决策者考虑通过补贴将按揭利率下调约1个百分点。高盛估算，如仅面向新贷，每年为居民节省约630亿元人民币，而扩大至存量按揭则可节省4,370亿元，相当于GDP的0.3–0.5%，或可使房价相对租金“估值合理”，但经验表明，泡沫破裂后价格往往会过度下跌后才见底回升。

I need to include essential numbers for my analysis: things like 100 million members, a 0.00002% representation by the Politburo, and the fact that prices in the 70 biggest cities have dropped significantly over the past year. Growth targets are set at 5%, with prices falling by 20-40% since 2021. Surveys show 2500 participants, half reporting paper losses, and 700,000 facing negative equity this year. I must structure the summary into paragraphs focusing on broader trends, households, and policy measures while preparing a Chinese translation.

China's Communist Party has over 100 million members, but only 23 leaders from the Politburo (0.00002%) determine policy. Their 2024 plan to stabilize the property market has struggled, with prices in 70 major cities falling rapidly despite some record sales, like a villa in Shanghai. On the bright side, exports are showing resilience, keeping the 5% growth target achievable. However, home prices have plunged 20-40% since 2021, with a significant number of households reporting paper losses.

Negative equity doesn't always lead to defaults; for instance, after 1997 in Hong Kong, only 1.4% of borrowers fell behind despite over 30% being underwater. However, in mainland China, falling collateral values are stressing both borrowers and banks. Around 25 trillion yuan of small business loans are secured by housing. UBS predicts up to 1.5 million foreclosures by 2026, with forced sales likely worsening the market.